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COMMENTS
MOVE OVER TICKERTAPE, HERE COMES THE
CYBER-EXCHANGE: THE RISE OF INTERNET-
BASED SECURITIES TRADING SYSTEMS
Daniel M. Gallagher+
With its unparalleled ability to bring people together, the Internet has
revolutionized many aspects of daily life in America.! Originally con-
ceived by the Department of Defense as a military program in 1969, the
Internet is now a global network of interconnected computers Count-
less Americans use the Internet to send and receive electronic mail, chat
with other Internet users, access vast databases of information, and shop
for various types of merchandise.4
+ J.D. candidate, December 1998, The Catholic University of America, Columbus
School of Law.
1. For a concise description of the history and capabilities of the Internet, see
HOWARD M. FRIEDMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION IN CYBERSPACE § 1.02 (1997).
2. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334 (1997) (discussing technical and histori-
cal aspects of the Internet, as well as some of the various services it offers). Research
done by the United States Department of Defense originally gave rise to the Internet. See
FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, § 1.02 at 1-4. A military program called "ARPANET" provided
the example used to develop the Internet. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2334. ARPANET is an
acronym for the Advanced Research Project Agency. See id. at 2334 n.3. ARPANET al-
lowed the military, defense contractors, and universities conducting defense-related re-
search to maintain communication with each other, even if the networks partially were
damaged due to war. See id. at 2334. Since the days of the now defunct ARPANET, the
Internet has experienced extraordinary growth. See id. The number of Internet users is
expected to increase to 200 million by 1999. See id.
3. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2334; see also Federal Networking Council, FNC Resolu-
tion: Definition of "Internet" (last modified Oct. 30, 1995) <http://www.fnc.gov/ Inter-
net res.html>. The Federal Networking Council has defined the Internet as:
the global information system that- (i) is logically linked together by a globally
unique address space based on the Internet Protocol (IP) or its subsequent ex-
tensions/follow-ons; (ii) is able to support communications using the Transmis-
sion Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite or its subsequent exten-
sions/follow-ons, and/or other IP-compatible protocols; and (iii) provides, uses or
makes accessible, either publicly or privately, high level services layered on the
communications and related infrastructure described herein.
Id.
4. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2334-35 (noting that "[i]t is no exaggeration to conclude
that the content of the Internet is as diverse as human thought.") (internal quotation omit-
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Within the general growth of business activity on the Internet, a spe-
cific market for the buying and selling of securities recently has
emerged. Traditionally, buyers and sellers of securities effect transac-
tions through broker-dealers6 present on the floor of conventional stock
exchanges, such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), or through
those broker-dealers who use the Nasdaq Stock Market system
(Nasdaq).7  With the advance of technology, however, investors and
other market participants can now utilize numerous alternatives to the
traditional securities trading methods. Although still in an early stage of
ted); see also Alexander C. Gavis, The Offering and Distribution of Securities in Cyber-
space: A Review of Regulatory and Industry Initiatives, 52 Bus. LAW. 317, 318 (1996) ("By
the end of the decade-if not sooner.., consumers will be able to purchase everything
from toothpaste to municipal bonds from their homes by using computer based-
networks."). But see Adrienne Fox, Was The Internet Overhyped? INVESTORS BUSINESS
DAILY, Oct. 10, 1997, at Al (noting that very few people make use of the Internet for
shopping). Many Internet users are wary of purchasing merchandise over the Internet be-
cause of concerns about publicly disseminating credit card information. See id.
5. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, § 6.01 at 6-2 (stating that several corporate issuers
plan to trade their securities on the Internet); see also Lourdes Gonzalez & Diane Mage
Roberts, Internet-Based and Other Online Trading Systems, INSIGHTS, July 1997 at 8, 8
(stating that the Internet is a uniquely suitable forum for issuing companies and third par-
ties to develop a market for securities because of its ability to reach millions of people in a
cost-effective manner).
6. The 1934 Act defines "broker" as "any person engaged in the business of effect-
ing transactions in securities for the account of others." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1994). The
1934 Act defines "dealer" as "any person engaged in the business of buying and selling
securities for his own account, through a broker or otherwise, but does not include a bank,
or any person insofar as he buys or sells securities for his own account, either individually
or in some fiduciary capacity, but not as a part of a regular business." Id. at § 78c(a)(5).
Securities firms typically operate as both brokers and dealers, and are, therefore, referred
to as "broker-dealers." See NORMAN S. POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND
REGULATION 1-6 n.12 (2d ed. 1997).
7. See generally Norman S. Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets: A Critical Look
at the SEC's National Market System, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 883, 885-96 (1981) (discussing the
structure of the United States securities markets and the forums available to buyers and
sellers of securities for trade execution).
8. See Regulation of Exchanges, Exchange Act Release No. 34-38672, 62 Fed. Reg.
30,485, 30,488 (June 4, 1997). In connection with the publication of the Regulation of Ex-
changes release (Release), the director of the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission's (SEC) Division of Market Regulation, Richard R. Lindsey, made a speech
discussing the need for the regulation of alternative trading systems and the related prom-
ulgation of the Release. See Richard R. Lindsey, Opening Statement (visited Sept. 30,
1997) <http://www.sec.gov./news/speeches/spch162.txt>. In his speech, Director Lindsey
noted that technology has impacted greatly upon the securities markets. See id. at 1.
Lindsey also stated that the SEC wanted the Release to start a dialogue regarding the best
way to regulate alternative trading systems. See id. at 2. Lindsey emphasized that the
Release was conceptual, and that the SEC designed it only to lay the foundation for future
changes to the regulatory process. See id. The SEC estimates that alternative trading sys-
tems now account for approximately 20% of over-the-counter (OTC) orders, and ap-
proximately 4% of orders for NYSE-listed securities. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62
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development, Internet-based securities trading systems promise to be
one of these alternatives.9
Many of the transgressions anticipated with the increase in Internet se-
curities trading are the same as those that originally spawned the enact-
ment of federal securities legislation ° in the 1930s." Although the forms
of abuse might remain the same, the Internet, with its ability to reach a
wide audience of investors, poses a unique challenge to the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with respect to enforcement
responsibilities." As Congress noted in the 1930s, the basic abuses in the
Fed. Reg. at 30,486. The term "alternative trading system" incorporates all automated
systems that centralize, display, match, cross, or otherwise execute trades, but are not reg-
istered with the SEC as national securities exchanges or operated by a registered securities
association. See id. at 30,486 n.1.
9. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, THE IMPACT OF RECENT TECHNOLOGICAL
ADVANCES ON THE SECURITIES MARKETS 124 (1997) [hereinafter TECHNOLOGY
REPORT] (discussing the Internet's developing nature and its effect on securities law en-
forcement activities).
10. The body of law generally referred to as the federal securities law includes: (1)
the Securities Act of 1933, (2) the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, (3) the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935, (4) the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, (5) the Investment
Company Act of 1940, and (6) the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. See JAMES D. Cox
ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 14-15,20 (1991).
11. See H.R. REP. No. 73-1383 at 1-2 (1934) (discussing the causes of dangerous stock
market speculation and the related need for federal regulation); see also Joseph J. Celia III
& John Reed Stark, SEC Enforcement and the Internet. Meeting the Challenge of the Next
Millennium, 52 BUS. LAW. 815, 830 (1997) (discussing the various abuses that may result
from Internet-based securities trading). Aware of the potential for such abuses, the SEC
has established a page on its Internet Web site devoted to an offensive against Internet-
based securities law violations. See Office of Investor Education and Assistance, SEC,
Investment Fraud and Abuse Travel to Cyberspace (last modified Oct. 17, 1996)
<http://www.sec.gov/consumer/cyberfr.htm>.
12. See TECHNOLOGY REPORT, supra note 9, at 127, 131 (discussing the uniqueness
of the Internet as a medium for securities trading and the traditional forms of abuse that
can occur on the Internet). For a more detailed insight into SEC Internet enforcement
activity, see SEC v. Chelekis, Litigation Release No. 15264, 63 SEC Docket (CCH) 2489
(Feb. 25, 1997) (involving the publication on the Internet of false and misleading state-
ments regarding several public companies); SEC v. Huttoe, Litigation Release No. 15153,
63 SEC Docket (CCH) 427, 428 (Nov. 7, 1996) (detailing a series of fraudulent acts by the
chief executive officer of a public company, including the bribery of the operators of an
electronically disseminated "tout sheet" in return for favorable recommendations for the
company); SEC v. Western Executive Group, Inc., Litigation Release No. 15106, 62 SEC
Docket (CCH) 2686, 2687 (Oct. 3, 1996) (describing a scheme involving the solicitation of
investors over the Internet to purchase investment contracts for the sale and lease of ATM
machines); SEC v. Wye Resources, Inc., Litigation Release No. 15073, 62 SEC Docket
(CCH) 2533, 2534 (Sept. 26, 1996) (describing the use of an Internet-based bulletin board
by a company to issue false messages regarding its exploitation of certain mining proper-
ties in Africa); In re Broad Capital Assocs., Inc., Securities Act Release No. 33-7338, 62
SEC Docket (CCH) 2430, 2431 (Sept. 26, 1996) (involving the publication of false press
releases about a company on an Internet bulletin board); SEC v. Sellin, Litigation Release
No. 15004, 62 SEC Docket (CCH) 1477 (Aug. 7, 1996) (involving a fraudulent offering of
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securities markets include fraudulent manipulation of stocks by brokers
and dealers, as well as the various deceptive devices employed by issu-
ers" in connection with securities disclosure practices.14 In response to
these violations-abuses that helped give rise to the stock market crash
of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression-Congress passed several
laws during the 1930s and 1940s designed to protect the nation's inves-
tors and securities markets from future manipulation and fraud.15 Of
these laws, the earliest were the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) and
securities through Internet postings and advertisements); SEC v. Octagon Tech. Group,
Inc., Litigation Release No. 14942, 62 SEC Docket (CCH) 380, 381 (June 11, 1996) (de-
scribing an elaborate sham offering of offshore debt securities via the Internet); SEC v.
Spencer, Litigation Release No. 14856, 61 SEC Docket (CCH) 1679 (Mar. 29, 1996) (in-
volving the Internet-based solicitation of investors by a company using false reports of its
business activities in the Dominican Republic); SEC v. Frye, Litigation Release No. 14720,
60 SEC Docket (CCH) 1787 (Nov. 15, 1995) (describing the solicitation of investors over
the Internet by the head of two Costa Rican companies, based upon false representations
of the companies' business dealings); SEC v. Block, Litigation Release No. 14598, 59 SEC
Docket (CCH) 2543 (Aug. 10, 1995) (involving the Internet-based advertisement of a se-
curities offering that gave inflated estimates of investment returns and falsely stated that
the investments were guaranteed); SEC v. Odulo, Litigation Release No. 14591, 59 SEC
Docket (CCH) 2538, 2539 (Aug. 7, 1995) (describing the solicitation of investors via the
Internet by a person promising inflated investment returns and investment insurance in
connection with the sale of bonds by an eel raising company); SEC v. Pleasure Time, Inc.,
Litigation Release No. 14440, 58 SEC Docket (CCH) 2659 (Mar. 15, 1995) (involving the
recruiting of investors via the Internet into a "worldwide lottery").
13. The term "issuer" generally is defined in the 1934 Act as "any person who issues
or proposes to issue any security." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(8) (1994).
14. See H.R. REP. No. 73-85 at 2 (1933) (discussing the issuance of fraudulent securi-
ties worth billions of dollars following World War I); see also COX ET AL., supra note 10,
at 15-16 (detailing how brokers and dealers sought to inflate stock prices fraudulently).
The severity of the economic situation in the United States, as perceived by Congress and
the public following the stock market crash of 1929, can best be realized by reading the
actual findings of the federal securities laws themselves. See id. The 1934 Act established
that:
National emergencies, which produce widespread unemployment and the dislo-
cation of trade, transportation, and industry, and which burden interstate com-
merce and adversely affect the general welfare, are precipitated, intensified, and
prolonged by manipulation and sudden and unreasonable fluctuations of security
prices and by excessive speculation on such exchanges and markets, and to meet
such emergencies the Federal Government is put to such great expense as to
burden the national credit.
15 U.S.C. § 78b(4) (1994).
15. See COX ET AL., supra note 10, at 14 (finding that the October 1929 stock market
crash and the Great Depression provided the political momentum needed to produce the
federal securities laws). The states originally regulated securities transactions, but Presi-
dent Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in proposing remedial securities legislation to Congress
in 1933, utilized the federal power over interstate commerce in order to justify federal
oversight of the securities markets. See CHARLES J. JOHNSON, JR. & JOSEPH
MCLAUGHLIN, CORPORATE FINANCE AND THE SECURITIES LAWS 1-3 (2d ed. 1997); see
also supra note 10 (providing a list of the federal securities laws).
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the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act). 16 The 1933 Act aimed to
redress the ills of the pre-crash market by mandating a uniform system of
disclosure by corporate issuers.17 Congress subsequently enacted the
1934 Act to regulate secondary market18 securities trading. 9 In addition,
the 1934 Act included a provision for the creation of the SEC. 0
A major provision within the 1934 Act deals with the creation and
regulation of national securities exchanges.1 Of the national exchanges
that have satisfied the 1934 Act's framework, the most prominent is the
NYSE. 2 The NYSE operates a traditional physical trading floor on
which securities trades are completed through human interaction.2 ' The
trades occur between member firms acting either as agents on behalf of
16. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1994).
17. See COX ET AL., supra note 10, at 14, 16 (distinguishing the 1933 Act from the
1934 Act, and noting that the 1933 Act is tailored to the narrow task of registering public
offerings of securities not otherwise exempted from regulation).
18. The secondary market can be defined as "exchanges and over-the-counter mar-
kets where securities are bought and sold subsequent to original issuance, which took
place in the primary market. Proceeds of secondary market sales accrue to the selling
dealers and investors, not to the companies that originally issued the securities." JOHN
DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT
TERMS 508 (4th ed. 1995).
19. See 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 513 (3d ed. 1995) (stating that the 1934 Act "imposes registration and re-
porting requirements upon issuers of certain securities; it also regulates securities dealers
and other market professionals, national securities exchanges, self regulatory organiza-
tions.., as well as municipal securities, municipal securities dealers, and government se-
curities dealers") (internal footnotes omitted).
20. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (1994). The SEC is an independent agency in the execu-
tive branch of the federal government. See OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, POLICY
EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, THE WORK OF THE SEC 5
(1994) [hereinafter THE WORK OF THE SEC]. The SEC is nonpartisan, and it has quasi-
judicial power. See id. The purpose of the SEC is to administer the federal securities laws.
See id. The SEC consists of five members-a chairman and four commissioners-who
serve five year terms. See id. With the advice and consent of the Senate, the President
appoints each member. See id.
21. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1994) (setting forth the requirements for qualification as, and
regulation of, national securities exchanges).
22. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 19, at 3-4 (stating that the NYSE is the most prestigious
national exchange); see also COX ET AL., supra note 10, at 1188 (describing the NYSE as
one of the most important exchanges in the United States); NYSE, FACT BOOK FOR THE
YEAR 1996, at 3 (1997) (describing briefly the prominence of the NYSE). The NYSE con-
siders itself to be the most competitive stock market in the world, and the first truly global
stock market. See id. The NYSE dominates stock trading on exchanges, and accounts for
the highest dollar value of stocks traded on exchanges. See 5 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL
SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 2510, 2510-12 (3d ed. 1990).
23. See 5 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 22, at 2506-09 (describing trading activities
on the floor of traditional exchanges).
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buyers and sellers of securities, or, under certain circumstances, trading
for their own accounts as dealers.14 In order to satisfy the self-regulatory
requirements of the 1934 Act, the NYSE has promulgated rules and
regulations for its members in order to ensure a secure, fair market-
place."
Nasdaq, another securities market, is also subject to various 1934 Act
requirements." Unlike a traditional stock exchange, such as the NYSE,
Nasdaq does not have a physical trading floor; instead, Nasdaq utilizes a
computer-based system of trading that allows broker-dealers to execute
trades by viewing quotations on a computer terminal, and then tele-
phoning buyers and sellers directly."7 Nasdaq is regulated by the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), a self-regulatory or-
ganization, and ultimately is subject to SEC oversight.Y
Departing from the time-honored trading methods of the NYSE and
Nasdaq, a few Internet-based securities trading systems have recently re-
ceived SEC staff approval allowing them to provide a forum for investor
interaction.29 These new systems facilitate securities trading transactions
24. See id. at 2508-09; see also DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM'N, MARKET 2000: AN EXAMINATION OF CURRENT EQUITY MARKET
DEVELOPMENTS 11-6, 11-7 (1994) [hereinafter MARKET 2000 REPORT] (describing the
market alternatives available to securities buyers and sellers).
25. See generally N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) (1984) [hereinafter NYSE Guide] (provid-
ing the full text of the NYSE constitution, rules, and related materials).
26. Nasdaq is not a national securities exchange for purposes of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, and thus it is not subject to national securities exchange provisions of
that statute. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f 1994 (defining and establishing requirements for national
securities exchanges). Instead, Nasdaq is subject to the 1934 Act's requirements governing
registered securities associations. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (detailing the system of registra-
tion and regulation for securities associations).
27. See THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC., THE
NASDAQ HANDBOOK 11-12 (1987) [hereinafter NASDAQ HANDBOOK] (summarizing how
securities are traded through the Nasdaq system).
28. See id. at 513; see also infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (defining and de-
scribing self-regulatory organizations).
29. See, e.g., Internet Capital Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC No-Act
LEXIS 1096 at *2 (Dec. 24, 1997) [hereinafter Internet Capital No-Action Letter];
Flamemaster Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 762990 at *5-6 (Oct. 29, 1996)
[hereinafter Flamemaster No-Action Letter]; PerfectData Corp., SEC No-Action Letter,
1996 WL 480429 at *5-6 (Aug. 5, 1996) [hereinafter PerfectData No-Action Letter]; Real
Goods Trading Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 77,226 at 77,131, 77,134 (June 24, 1996) [hereinafter RGTC No-Action Let-
ter]; see also Celia & Stark, supra note 11, at 828-29 (discussing some of the SEC no-action
letters regarding Internet-based trading systems); infra notes 100-44 and accompanying
text (describing recent SEC positions regarding Internet-based securities offering sys-
tems).
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without the intervention of broker-dealers.3 ° The elimination of broker-
dealer fees is an attractive incentive to corporate issuers who experience
low trading volume in traditional securities markets,31 or cannot afford
the transaction costs associated with the offering and listing of their secu-
32rities in these markets. To date, SEC regulation of these systems has
occurred in a case-by-case manner. While this has provided significant
guidance for future endeavors in this area, it is not binding upon entities
contemplating the creation of fully interactive Internet-based securities
exchanges.33
Seeking to regulate alternative securities trading systems more com-
prehensively, in June 1997 the SEC published a concept release (Re-
lease) in the Federal Register requesting comment on the current regula-
tory and statutory framework for alternative trading systems. 4 While the
Release did not focus specifically upon the regulation of Internet-based
trading systems, the scope of the Release will directly impact the future
30. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, § 6.04 at 6-12 (stating that new electronic trading
systems bypass broker-dealers).
31. See, e.g., RGTC No-Action Letter, supra note 29, at 77,131 (involving a corporate
issuer that utilized the Internet to sell its stock because the stock experienced light trading
on a regional stock exchange). Real Goods Trading Corp. (RGTC) securities were traded
on the Pacific Stock Exchange. See id. The market for RGTC stock was very illiquid be-
cause of light trading of the stock on the Pacific Stock Exchange. See id. The average
daily trading volume for RGTC stock was 850 shares. See id. Presumably due to this li-
quidity problem, RGTC wanted to establish a "passive bulletin board" Internet-based
trading system for its stock. See id.
32. See Angel Capital Electronic Network, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 636094
at *1 (Oct. 25, 1996) [hereinafter Angel Capital No-Action Letter] (involving the creation
of a third party, Internet-based listing service for small businesses). One of the biggest
obstacles to success for small businesses is the high transaction costs of obtaining equity
capital needed to expand businesses. See id. at *2. The Angel Capital No-Action Letter
discussed the possibility of an Internet-based system of trading for small businesses need-
ing access to equity capital, but unable to afford the associated transaction fees. See id. A
company generally may acquire funding it needs for expansion through loans from banks,
or from a public or private offering of stock in the company. See COX ET AL., supra note
10, at 216. In order to effectuate a stock offering, a company usually would engage the
services of broker-dealers. See id. The broker-dealers could agree to purchase the securi-
ties from the issuing company for resale to the public, or simply agree to use their "best
efforts" to sell the stock to the public. See id. at 216-17. In either situation, the broker-
dealer gains a commission typically equal to the difference between the price of the stock
as sold and the amount that is paid to the issuer. See id. at 217-18.
33. See infra notes 109-44 and accompanying text (examining the several no-
action/interpretive positions of the SEC with respect to Internet-based systems).
34. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,485. The SEC noted that tech-
nological advances have posed significant challenges to the existing regulatory framework.
See id. at 30,486. In its search for "forward-looking" regulation, the SEC noted that the
exponential growth of alternative trading systems is one of the developments that under-
scores the need for amendment of the current regulatory system. See id.
1998] 1015
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regulation of Internet-based trading?5 The Release suggested two alter-
native regulatory approaches that the SEC could employ: (1) amending
the current 1934 Act definition of "exchange" to incorporate alternative
trading systems; or (2) regulating alternative trading systems under a
slightly modified version of the current statutory and regulatory frame-
work for broker-dealers.36 In a proposed rule that followed the Release,
the SEC proposed combining the two alternatives outlined in the Re-
lease, and allowing the operators of alternative trading systems to choose
between exchange regulation and continued broker-dealer regulation.37
Although both of these approaches evidence the SEC's desire to accom-
modate changing regulatory needs, they too closely adhere to current
regulation to be truly effective.38 In order to provide efficient regulation
and to promote the growth of alternative trading systems, the SEC must
partner with the private sector to create a national securities association
with a mandate to regulate and foster non-traditional trading systems. 9
This Comment studies the unique regulatory issues that arise in the
context of Internet-based securities trading and the standing of such
trading under the existing federal securities laws. In addition, this Com-
ment examines the regulatory structures that the SEC could employ to-
ward its goal to efficiently and effectively regulate alternative trading sys-
tems. Part I examines the background of the current federal securities
laws and the rise of both traditional and non-traditional securities mar-
kets. Part II provides an overview of the regulatory structures for alter-
native trading systems that the SEC suggested in the June 1997 Release.
Part III of this Comment focuses on the adequacy of the SEC's suggested
regulatory approaches in the Release as applied to Internet-based securi-
ties trading systems. Part IV of this Comment analyzes the proposals set
35. See generally id. at 30,486-88. The Release indirectly encompassed possible
Internet-based securities trading systems within its broad definition of "alternative trading
systems" and the suggested redefinition of the term "exchange." See id. at 30,486 n.1,
30,487. The Release defined alternative trading systems as "automated systems that cen-
tralize, display, match, cross, or otherwise execute trading interest, but that are not cur-
rently registered with the [SEC] as national securities exchanges or operated by a regis-
tered securities association." Id. at 30,486 n.1. For information regarding the Release's
suggestion to redefine the term "exchange," see infra Part II.B.
36. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,487.
37. See Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-39884, 63 Fed. Reg. 23,504, 23,506. (April 29, 1998).
38. See infra notes 201-42 and accompanying text (discussing the SEC's suggestions in
the Release and their related shortcomings).
39. See infra notes 260-76 and accompanying text (advocating the creation of a new
national securities association to act as both regulator and guardian for alternative trading
systems).
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forth in the SEC's April 1998 proposed rule. This Comment concludes
by suggesting that the SEC should consider an entirely different regula-
tory structure for Internet-based and other non-traditional securities ex-
changes. This new structure would involve the creation of a new national
securities association under the 1934 Act-a regulatory system capable
of ensuring efficiency while maintaining the statutory mandates of the
federal securities laws.
I. THE RISE OF TRADITIONAL AND NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITIES
MARKETS
Congress created the SEC as an independent agency of the federal
government designed to administer the federal securities legislation.
40
Congress passed the SEC's enabling statute, the 1934 Act, 1 in the after-
math of the 1929 stock market crash.42 The 1934 Act established a statu-
tory framework by which Congress could create a system of securities
regulation in the United States.43 The 1934 Act also specifically provided
for the registration and regulation of national securities exchanges."
In 1975, Congress amended the 1934 Act in an effort to "ensure fair
and orderly markets, to prevent fraud and manipulation, and to promote
market coordination and competition for the benefit of all investors.
4
1
In order to achieve these goals, Congress empowered the SEC to adopt
rules promoting (1) economically efficient securities transaction execu-
40. See THE WORK OF THE SEC, supra note 20, at 5 (describing the SEC and its
statutory powers). The SEC staff attempts to ensure compliance with the federal securi-
ties laws by various securities market participants, including publicly-held entities, broker-
dealers, investment companies, and investment advisers. See id.; see also Louis Loss &
JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 50-51 (3d ed. 1995) (de-
scribing the structural organization of the Securities and Exchange Commission).
41. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1994) (providing the text of the 1934 Act).
42. Cf. JOHNSON & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 15, at 1 (describing the economic con-
dition of the United States and the mood of investors following the great stock market
crash of October 1929).
43. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 40, at 34 (analyzing the 1934 Act).
44. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1994). The 1934 Act defines "exchange" as:
[A]ny organization, association, or group of persons, whether incorporated or
unincorporated, which constitutes, maintains, or provides a market place or fa-
cilities for bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities or for otherwise
performing with respect to securities the functions commonly performed by a
stock exchange as that term is generally understood, and includes the market
place and the market facilities maintained by such exchange.
Id. at § 78c(a)(1).
45. Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,489; see also Securities Acts
Amendments of 1975 § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(1) (1994).
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tion;4' (2) fair competition;47 (3) dissemination of current quotations and
related information (transparency); 4 (4) investor access to the best mar-
kets; 9 and (5) the opportunity, consistent with (1) and (4) above, to exe-
cute orders without dealer involvement. °
In 1996, Congress enacted legislation which authorized the SEC toS5 1
grant exemptions from 1933 and 1934 Act requirements. Such exemp-
tions could, for example, release market participants from certain aspects
of the 1934 Act's reporting and registration requirements. The Senate
Report accompanying the 1996 legislation indicates that Congress con-
sidered the rise of novel trading systems when it gave the SEC this broad
exemptive authority. 3
A. Traditional Securities Trading Forums
Currently, eight securities exchanges are registered with the SEC as
national securities exchanges pursuant to the 1934 Act. 4 Securities ex-
46. See 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(1)(C)(i).
47. See id. § 78k-l(a)(1)(C)(ii).
48. See id. § 78k-l(a)(1)(C)(iii); see also MARKET 2000 REPORT, supra note 24, at 17
("Transparency refers to the real-time dissemination of information about prices, volume,
and trades.").
49. See 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(1)(C)(iv).
50. See 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(1)(C)(v). For a detailed examination of the provisions
of 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a), see S. REP. No. 94-75, at 8 (1975); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-229,
at 92 (1975); see also MARKET 2000 REPORT, supra note 24, at 5 (discussing the regulatory
goals of 15 U.S.C. §78k-l(a)(1)).
51. See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290,
§ 105(b), 110 Stat. 3424, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78mm (West 1997); see also Regulation of Ex-
changes, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,499 & n.83; S. REP. No. 104-293, at 15 (1996) (describing Con-
gress's rationale for granting new exemptive authority to the SEC).
52. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,502 (discussing some of the vari-
ous requirements from which the SEC could provide exemptive relief).
53. See S. REP. No. 104-293, at 15 ("For example, the SEC could deal with the regu-
latory concerns raised by the recent proliferation of electronic trading systems, which do
not fit neatly into the existing regulatory framework"); see also Regulation of Exchanges,
62 Fed. Reg. at 30,499 n.83 (noting the specific reference to alternative trading systems in
S. Rep. No. 104-293).
54. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,490 n.24. Of the national securi-
ties exchanges, the two primary exchanges are the New York Stock Exchange and the
American Stock Exchange (Amex). See MARKET 2000 REPORT, supra note 24, at 11-6.
The Amex has lower listing standards than the NYSE, and thus serves as a market for the
securities of smaller, younger companies. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 40, at 606. It
is common for companies that are listed on the Amex to transfer their listings to the
NYSE once they satisfy the more stringent NYSE listing requirements. See id. In this
sense, the Amex serves as the "minor league" to the NYSE's "major league." See id.
In addition to the NYSE and the Amex, five regional exchanges exist: the Boston Stock
Exchange, the Chicago Stock Exchange, the Cincinnati Stock Exchange, the Pacific Stock
1018 [Vol. 47:1009
Here Comes the Cyber-Exchange
changes primarily function to provide liquidity in trading, a characteristic
which allows investors to buy or sell securities at a reasonable price and
within a reasonable amount of time.55 Although all eight exchanges and
the Nasdaq market share the common goal of efficiently facilitating secu-
rities trading, the means used to accomplish this goal vary greatly.
1. The New York Stock Exchange
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has the highest share volume
and dollar value of trades among the exchanges, and is an important
price discovery market.56 Although the SEC regulates the NYSE, the
NYSE is also a self-regulatory organization (SRO)." An SRO is defined
in the 1934 Act as "any national securities exchange, registered securities
association, or registered clearing agency. 5 8 By virtue of this definition,
all SEC-registered exchanges are by law SROs, having "quasi-
governmental authority" over their members. 9 By creating a two-tier
Exchange, and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange See MARKET 2000 REPORT, supra note
24, at 11-6 to 11-7. The Chicago Board Option Exchange registered to trade stock in 1990,
but to date has only traded options. See id. at 11-20 n.27.
55. See Poser, supra note 7, at 886, 889 (describing the composition and functions of
the United States securities markets and the important liquidity function served by stock
exchanges). The securities markets can be divided into two separate types of markets, the
issuing markets and the trading markets. See id. at 886. The stock exchanges and the
over-the-counter market comprise the trading markets. See id. at 886-87.
56. See 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 22, at 2510 (discussing the dominance of the
NYSE in exchange trading); MARKET 2000 REPORT, supra note 24, at 11-8 (stating that
the NYSE provides an important price discovery function); see also Regulation of Ex-
changes, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,488 n.7 (comparing the volume and aggregate dollar values of
trading activity on the NYSE and in the Nasdaq market). Price discovery refers to the
quoting of prices for stock by the primary market (i.e. NYSE), and the use of these quotes
by other market participants (i.e. proprietary trading systems) to establish prices for the
same stock. See MARKET 2000 REPORT, supra note 24, at 1H-8. Active pricing markets
establish the price at which securities trade "through the interaction of priced orders of
sellers with priced orders of buyers, or through participant dissemination of quotes."
Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg at 30,501.
57. See COX ET AL., supra note 10, at 29. The 1934 Act encompasses four types of
SROs: national securities exchanges, the national securities association, registered clearing
agencies, and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board. See id. Because it is registered
as a national securities exchange under § 6 of the 1934 Act, the NYSE is an SRO recog-
nized by the SEC. See id.
58. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26) (1994).
59. See COX ET AL., supra note 10, at 1190 (stating that exchanges are given principal
responsibility for their own regulation after having registered with the SEC). Although
SROs are given "quasi-governmental authority" in an area where regulation is critical, the
SROs are comprised of members who have an inherent self-interest which is incongruous
to the public interest. See id. See generally David A. Lipton, Governance of Our Securities
Markets and the Failure to Allocate Regulatory Responsibility, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 397
(1985) (discussing the structure and inherent problems of the regulatory system estab-
lished in the 1934 Act); David A. Lipton, The SEC or the Exchanges: Who Should Do
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system of regulation, the relationship between the SEC and SROs aims
to ensure safe, fair, and open United States securities markets for all in-
vestors.6"
In order to fulfill the 1934 Act's SRO requirements, the NYSE consti-
tution, along with rules promulgated by the NYSE board of directors, es-
tablished a complex body of regulation. 6' These regulatory requirements
encompass all activities that take place in the course of exchange busi-
ness, from member conduct to the trading rules.6" In addition to ensuring
a stable and efficient marketplace, the NYSE rules are designed to instill
investors with confidence.63  NYSE oversight activity mirrors, on a
smaller scale, the SEC's regulatory role.6'
What and When? A Proposal to Allocate Regulatory Responsibilities for Securities Mar-
kets, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 527 (1983) (analyzing the division of regulatory authority be-
tween the exchanges and the SEC, and offering suggestions for a more efficient allocation
of such authority); Sam Scott Miller, Self-Regulation of the Securities Markets: A Critical
Examination, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 853 (1985) (detailing and commenting upon the
self-regulatory structure within the securities markets); James J. Moylan, The Place of
Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry, 6 SEc. REG. L.J. 49 (1978) (reviewing the impact
of 1975 securities law amendments on the self-regulatory system established in the 1934
Act).
60. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 40, at 643-44 (discussing the philosophy un-
derlying self-regulation in the securities markets).
61. See generally 2 NYSE Guide, supra note 25, f 1002 (setting forth the "objects and
purposes" of the NYSE constitution).
62. See id. at 2601-3000 (providing the NYSE rules for dealings and settlements); id.
at 3001-500 (governing member admission to the NYSE); id. at 4051-200 (setting forth the
disciplinary rules for NYSE members).
63. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (requiring that the rules of national stock exchanges
protect investors and facilitate a free and open market). Specifically, the 1934 Act states
that:
The rules of the exchange are designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative
acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles of trade, to foster co-
operation and coordination with persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling,
processing information with respect to, and facilitating transactions in securities,
to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market
and a national market system, and, in general, to protect investors and the public
interest.
Id. (emphasis added).
64. See H.R. REP. No. 75-2307, at 4-6 (1938) (discussing the theory behind "coopera-
tive regulation"). Congress has found the operation of a well-conducted stock exchange to
be the perfect example of how self-regulation can be accomplished by private organiza-
tions, rather than by the SEC. See id. at 5. With the passage of the 1934 Act, Congress
gave the SEC the means to achieve substantial regulation; the Act required virtually every
market that met the statutory definition of an "exchange" to register with the SEC. See
15 U.S.C. §§ 78e-78f. Congress provided an exemption for exchanges that, in the SEC's
opinion, had such limited volume that the interest in protecting the public and investors
was minimal. See id. § 78e. In addition, Congress determined that every registered ex-
change, in connection with the self-regulatory mandates, must assist the SEC in assuring
fair and honest markets, and must establish rules for self regulation. See id. § 78f(b). The
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The SEC's Division of Market Regulation oversees the daily activity of
the various exchanges." Likewise, the NYSE's market surveillance de-
partment constantly monitors the trading activity of the NYSE. 66 The
market surveillance department searches for illegal activities, such as• • 67
stock manipulation and insider trading,68 problems common to the secu-
rities industry.69 To accomplish its surveillance activity, the NYSE im-
plemented Stock Watch, an electronic monitoring system that flags un-
SEC is required to review and approve the rules for self-regulation prior to their passage.
See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,489-90.
65. See THE WORK OF THE SEC, supra note 20, at 27 (explaining how the SEC's Di-
vision of Market Regulation is responsible for overseeing the secondary markets, includ-
ing the registration and regulation of broker-dealers, SROs, and other secondary market
participants).
66. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCH., INC., 1996 ANN. REP. 16, 17 (1997) [hereinafter
NYSE ANNUAL REPORT] (describing briefly the activity of the NYSE market surveillance
department); NYSE, Regulating the Market (visited Mar. 27, 1998)
<http://www.nyse.com/public/invprot/5a/5aix.htm> (discussing the NYSE's market sur-
veillance programs); David P. Doherty et al., The Enforcement Role of the New York
Stock Exchange, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 637 (1991) (providing a comprehensive examination
of NYSE enforcement procedures); cf. Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,493
(describing the role of market surveillance in monitoring market activity to prevent fraud).
67. See generally 8-9 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 22, at 3939-3942 (discussing the
"classic portrait of manipulation). Manipulation is defined as:
The act of depressing or raising securities prices artificially so that prices do not
represent true value. This is done by creating an appearance of active buying or
selling, either alone or in concert with others. Manipulation violates federal se-
curities laws and is subject to criminal and civil penalties.
ALLAN H. PESSIN & JOSEPH A. ROSS, WORDS OF WALL STREET: 2000 INVESTMENT
TERMS DEFINED 130 (1983).
68. "Under the 'traditional' or 'classical theory' of insider trading liability ... a cor-
porate insider trades in the securities of his corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic
information." United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2207 (1997). In addition to cor-
porate officers, directors, and permanent insiders, the classical theory applies to "attor-
neys, accountants, consultants, and others who temporarily become fiduciaries of a corpo-
ration." Id. (citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983)). Another theory of insider
trading liability, the "misappropriation theory," states that a fraud occurs when a person
"misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a
duty owed to the source of the information." Id. The classical and misappropriation theo-
ries complement each other in an effort to stem the misuse of nonpublic information. See
id. See generally 7-8 LOSs & SELIGMAN, supra note 22, at 3404-48 (discussing the presence
of fraud in the United States securities markets and the specific problems associated with
insider trading).
69. See Arthur Levitt, A Question of Integrity: Promoting Investor Confidence by
Fighting Insider Trading, Remarks at the "S.E.C. Speaks" Conference (visited Apr. 15,
1998) <http://www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch202.txt> (discussing the large number of
insider trading cases that the SEC handles each year); see also Doherty et al., supra note
66, at 640 (describing the types of cases that the NYSE's Division of Enforcement encoun-
ters and investigates); see also New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Regulating the Market
(visited Mar. 27, 1998) <http://www.nyse.com/public/invprot/5a/5aix.htm> (discussing po-
tentially suspicious trading activity).
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usual price and volume activity in NYSE-listed securities. 70 When mar-
ket surveillance detects suspicious trading, the NYSE's Enforcement Di-
vision investigates and, if necessary, takes disciplinary action against the
suspected violator or refers the action to the SEC for further investiga-
71tion.
Underlying all NYSE regulatory activity are the statutory mandates of
the 1934 Act.72 Because the NYSE is a registered national securities ex-
change, it must comply with section 6 of the 1934 Act.73  Given the
NYSE's self-regulatory responsibilities under the 1934 Act, the exchange
also must further the general regulatory and oversight purposes of the
statute that would otherwise be within the SEC's realm.74 To fulfill its
regulatory role, the NYSE enforces member compliance with the 1934
Act, the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, and the NYSE
rules.75 As such, the NYSE attempts to carry out the 1934 Act's goals of
ensuring fair and honest markets and protecting investors, thereby fur-
thering the underlying statutory premise of safeguarding the national
public interest.76
2. The Nasdaq Market
Like the NYSE, the Nasdaq Stock Market (Nasdaq) provides a market
in which buyers and sellers of securities can execute trades.77 The Na-
70. See NYSE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 16, 17 (describing the thorough
oversight activity that occurs at the NYSE). The Stock Watch system of the NYSE is
"one of the world's most highly automated market monitoring systems." Id. at 16. Be-
cause of its own market surveillance activities, the NYSE made 54 referrals of possible se-
curities law violations to the SEC in 1996. See id. at 16. The NYSE also has an Auto-
mated Search and Match system that examines customer, member, and company
information in order to identify potential wrongdoers. See id. at 17.
71. See Doherty et al., supra note 66, at 639-40 (detailing the procedure for case in-
vestigation by the NYSE Division of Enforcement).
72. See id. at 637-38 (stating that the NYSE has a mandate to enforce the 1934 Act).
73. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1994) (providing the text of § 6 of the 1934 Act); see also
Doherty et al., supra note 66, at 637-38 (describing the 1934 Act's regulatory mandates for
exchanges, and how the NYSE implements such requirements).
74. See Doherty et al., supra note 66, at 637-38 (stating that one of the principal func-
tions of the NYSE is to enforce the 1934 Act); see also Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed.
Reg. at 30,493 (discussing the responsibility of SROs to complying with the 1934 Act as
well as carrying out the purposes of the Act).
75. See Doherty et al., supra note 66, at 637; see also Regulation of Exchanges, 62
Fed. Reg. at 30,493.
76. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (stating the national policy goals with respect to the enact-
ment of the 1934 Act); see also The New York Stock Exch., Investor Protection (visited
Mar. 27, 1998) <http://www.nyse.com/public/invprot/05ix.htm> (describing the objectives
of NYSE regulation).
77. See Poser, supra note 7, at 895 n.47 (describing the technology and the setup of
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tional Association of Securities Dealers developed Nasdaq, and the mar-
ket began operation in 1971.78 Originally, Nasdaq was a part of the re-
sidual securities market commonly known as the "over the counter"
(OTC) market.79 Nasdaq has since developed into a formal marketplace
separate from the OTC." Nasdaq, which lists approximately 6300 stocks
for more than 5500 companies, is the second largest stock market in the
world.81
Despite its comparable size, the Nasdaq market differs significantly
from the NYSE."' First, the Nasdaq market is an electronic quotation
system in which brokers or dealers" represent buyers and sellers of secu-
rities throughout the trading process." The brokers and dealers receive
the Nasdaq system).
78. See id. The NASD is, to date, the only national securities association registered
with the SEC. See id. at 1191. The NASD is an association of brokers and dealers which is
registered with the SEC pursuant to section 15A of the 1934 Act. See id. The NASD is
comprised of more than 5500 member firms. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, 1996 ANN.
REP. 53 (1996). The NASD owns and operates the Nasdaq stock market through an inde-
pendent subsidiary, The Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. See NASD, THE NASDAQ STOCK
MARKET 1997 FACT BOOK & COMPANY DIRECTORY 1 (1997) [hereinafter NASDAQ
FACT BOOK].
79. See National Ass'n Sec. Dealers, Ask the Economist (visited Feb. 12, 1998)
<http://www.nasdaq.com/sitelayout.asp?section=/reference/reference.htm> (stating that
Nasdaq began as a quotation service for OTC securities, but is now a securities market
separate from the OTC market). The OTC market is the securities market in which those
transactions not taking place on a stock exchange are executed. See Poser, supra note 7, at
894. The OTC handles trades of government and corporate bonds, as well as trading in
shares of industrial and commercial enterprises. See id. Brokers and dealers who trade in
the OTC market are required to be registered with the SEC, but are not required to be
members of a national securities exchange. See id. Most of the brokers and dealers who
trade on the OTC market are members of the NASD. See id.
80. See NASDAQ FACT BOOK, supra note 78, at 1.
81. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,488 n.7; NASDAQ FACT BOOK,
supra note 78, at 1. The total dollar volume of all trades made on the Nasdaq is almost
equal to that of the NYSE. See Regulation of Exchanges, supra, at 30,488 n.7. Companies
listed on Nasdaq are divided into two categories, the Nasdaq SmallCap Market, and the
Nasdaq National Market. See NASDAQ FACT BOOK, supra note 78, at 1. The SmallCap
Market is for small and medium sized companies, while the National Market operates for
larger companies. See id.
82. See 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 22, at 2578 (describing transactions occur-
ring in the OTC market and noting how they differ from transactions executed on tradi-
tional exchanges). Perhaps the most noticeable difference between OTC and exchange
trading is the lack of a centralized trading floor in the OTC. See id.
83. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (providing the definitions of "broker,"
"dealer," and "broker-dealers").
84. See Poser, supra note 7, at 895 n.47 (describing the trading that occurs on the
Nasdaq market). The parties involved in Nasdaq trading communicate through tele-
phones and computer terminals, and are thus distanced from personal contact throughout
the trading process. See id.; see also infra note 84 (describing generally the trading mecha-
nisms in the Nasdaq market). Cf. 5 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 22, at 2513-15 (dis-
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real-time price quotations on Nasdaq-listed securities via computer ter-
minals.5 As a result, the broker-dealers can execute trades by monitor-
ing the quotations listed on the computer screen, and then telephoning
6
the market maker in that security to execute trades for the client. 
8
cussing the NYSE's use of the "specialist" to effectuate securities trading). A specialist is
a member of the exchange that serves three functions: (1) broker; (2) dealer; and (3) auc-
tioneer. See id. at 2513-14. Specialists essentially are awarded a monopoly right to make a
market in their securities. See id. at 2514.
85. See 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 22, at 2580-81. The Nasdaq system utilizes a
Central Processing Complex that is connected to individual computer terminals used by
brokers and dealers for trading. See id. The computers are connected to the central proc-
essing unit by high-speed trunk lines, regional concentrator centers, and leased telephone
lines. See id. at 2581. Nasdaq computer terminals are divided into three groups, depend-
ing on the level of the user's activity. See id. The first level of Nasdaq trading allows bro-
kers to receive bid and ask quotations for Nasdaq-listed securities. See id. On the second
level, brokers or dealers receive quotations along with the names of the "market makers"
and the size of trades. See id. In the third level, used only by market makers and broker-
dealers, market makers are able to insert quotes into the Nasdaq system. See id. "Market
maker" is defined in the 1934 Act as a broker-dealer who "holds himself out (by entering
quotations in an inter-dealer communications system or otherwise as being willing to buy
and sell [a] security for his own account on a regular or continuous basis." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(38) (1994); see also Byrnes v. Faulkner, Dawkins & Sullivan, 550 F.2d 1303, 1307
n.1 (2d Cir. 1977) (quoting Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 250 F. Supp. 668, 671 (S.D.N.Y.),
affd, 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966) (per curiam) (defining "market maker" as "a broker-
dealer who, with respect to a particular security that is not traded on a national securities
exchange (an 'over the counter' security), 'report[s] for quotation 'bid' and 'asked' prices
to indicate, respectively, amounts for which it propose[s] to buy or sell stock"').
As with many of today's computer systems, Nasdaq has experienced some glitches that
have affected trading. See GAO Report Recommends SEC, NASD Improve Oversight of
Nasdaq Market, 27 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 15 (Jan. 6, 1995) (detailing the General
Accounting Office's recommendations for better oversight of Nasdaq following instances
of malfunction in the trading mechanism); Nasdaq Informs Markey of Plans to Prevent
Repeat of Computer Failures, 26 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1368 (1994) (discussing
NASD's reaction to computer failures that shut down Nasdaq trading in 1994).
86. With certain exceptions, trading of Nasdaq-listed securities occurs by telephone.
See MARKET 2000 REPORT, supra note 24, at 10. The exceptions to telephone trading on
Nasdaq involve trading on the Small Order Execution System and the SelectNet systems.
See id. These systems allow Nasdaq market makers to execute and display orders through
Nasdaq terminals. See id.
87. See 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 22, at 2581 (detailing the tiered structure of
the Nasdaq trading system). A broker acts as a salesperson throughout the securities
buying/selling transaction. See POSER, supra note 6, at 2-4. In order to obtain the service
of the broker, however, an investor must give the broker the power to act on his behalf.
See id. While this system of representation provides the broker with the freedom to act
for the investor's best interests, it also invites fraudulent activity on the part of the broker.
See id. Because the broker acts as the investor's agent, a common law fiduciary relation-
ship is created. See id. at 2-3. Under this fiduciary relationship, the broker is legally obli-
gated to act in the best interests of the investor. See id. at 2-3 to 2-4. The fiduciary duties
imposed upon brokers and dealers are based, in part, upon the "shingle theory." See
DAVID A. LIPTON, 15A BROKER-DEALER REGULATION 5-2 (1997). The shingle theory
has been described "as having two components: (1) a duty to deal fairly with the customer,
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Along with the fact that it is a computer-based system, Nasdaq can be
distinguished from traditional exchanges by its system of competing
market makers.8"
There is a significant difference between the NYSE and the Nasdaq
regarding the manner in which trades are concluded. Unlike Nasdaq's
system of market makers posting bid and ask quotations on a computer,89
the NYSE is a continuous agency auction market.90 While NYSE spe-
cialists present on the floor of the exchange are physically in a position to
participate in all trading, Nasdaq broker-dealers control trading activity
from various locations using Nasdaq computer terminals.91
Like the NYSE's self-monitoring systems, the NASD has created
regulatory organs to continuously monitor Nasdaq trading activity.92 Al-
though their trading procedures differ significantly, the NYSE and the
Nasdaq are subject to similar self-regulatory oversight.93
The NASD is the SRO for the Nasdaq market.94 In response to an in-
ternal review of its system of governance, the NASD divided its SRO re-
sponsibilities and the operation of the Nasdaq market between two sub-
and (2) a duty to deal with the customer in accordance with the standards of the profes-
sion." Id. at 5-6 to 5-7.
88. See 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 22, at 2578 (noting the difference between
exchanges with respect to Nasdaq's use of competing market makers); see also NASD,
Nasdaq Glossary (visited Feb. 12,1998) <http://www.nasd.com/sitelayout.asp?section=
/reference/reference.htm> (discussing the differences between Nasdaq and the traditional
securities markets). Nasdaq market makers "represent a stock and compete with each
other to buy and sell the stocks they represent." Id.
89. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing Nasdaq's system of securi-
ties trading).
90. See COX ET AL., supra note 10, at 1282. Traditional exchanges, such as the
NYSE, trade securities in "'a continuous two-sided auction market."' Id. at 1282. Each
traded security has a designated place on the floor of the exchange where specialists in
that security execute trades. See id.; see also New York Stock Exch., The Auction Market
(visited Mar. 27, 1998) <http://www.nyse.com/public/thenyse/lb/lbix.htm> (describing
generally the auction market atmosphere within the exchange). Although many of the
NYSE's functions have been automated during the past 23 years, the exchange remains
primarily an auction market in which specialists handle the auction process. See MARKET
2000 REPORT, supra note 24, at 36 n.21.
91. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing the trading operations of
Nasdaq).
92. See NASDAQ HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 513-25 (describing Nasdaq's regula-
tory systems). The NASD has established a Market Surveillance Section to oversee the
Nasdaq. See id. at 514. In addition, various computer-generated reports help Market Sur-
veillance oversee the exchange. See id. at 515-17.
93. Compare NASDAQ HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 515-17 (explaining the opera-
tions of the NASD's Market Surveillance Section), with supra note 70 and accompanying
text (describing the NYSE's Stock Watch System and its regulatory oversight role).
94. See NASDAQ HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 513 (noting that the NASD regulates
Nasdaq).
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sidiaries.95 The internal review found NASD's governance structure in-
sufficient to maintain the distinction between broker-dealer regulation
and the operation of Nasdaq.96  Concurrently with NASD's self-
examination, the SEC and the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice were investigating, among other things, the operations of the
NASD and the Nasdaq market, and examining allegations of anti-
competitive practices and collusion.97 The NASD settled the administra-
tive charges brought by the SEC, and the Department of Justice settled
its civil antitrust charges with several securities firms.9' As part of its
95. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 REGARDING THE NASD AND THE NASDAQ
MARKET 4-5 (1996) [hereinafter NASD REPORT] (discussing specific remedial measures,
including the restructuring of the NASD governance system, implemented by the NASD
following an internal review). The NASD reorganized its governance structure by creat-
ing a Board of Governors comprised of a majority of non-industry members. See id. at 4.
In addition, the NASD created two subsidiaries, NASD Regulation, Inc. (NASDR), and
The Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. See id at 4-5. NASDR is responsible for regulatory mat-
ters, and The Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. is responsible for operating Nasdaq. See id.
Both subsidiaries have a board of directors equally comprised of industry and non-
industry members. See id. at 5.
96. See id. at 10. The committee undertaking the review of the NASD's governance
structure was chaired by former United States Senator Warren Rudman. See id. at 9.
Rudman's committee (Committee) found that the NASD was governed by a large number
of internal committees, each with its own agenda and the ability to assert its specific influ-
ence. See id. at 10. The Committee also found that one specific internal NASD commit-
tee, the Trading Committee, had significant influence over the Nasdaq market and was
mostly comprised of dealers, not a representative body of Nasdaq constituents. See id. at
11.
97. See Suzanne Manning & Rachel Wilmer, NASD Settles SEC Charges over Alleged
Abuses in Nasdaq Market, 28 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 967 (Aug. 9, 1996) (discussing
the SEC's settlement with NASD, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt noted that Nasdaq's "cul-
ture of collaboration" curtailed competition). The Department of Justice (DOJ) settle-
ment encompassed 24 major securities firms that trade on the Nasdaq market. See id. at
968. The DOJ investigation was prompted by lawsuits that alleged collusion among cer-
tain Nasdaq market makers. See id.
As part of its investigation, the SEC generated a report regarding the NASD and the
Nasdaq market. See NASD REPORT, supra note 95, at 1. The report found that the
NASD market makers used the NASD regulatory process to employ anti-competitive tac-
tics, including an attempt to restrict the use of Nasdaq's Small Order Execution System
(SOES). See id. at 11. NASD established SOES to execute small orders in Nasdaq stocks.
See id. at A-56. SOES participants, namely SOES market makers and SOES order entry
firms, are required to be registered with the NASD. See id. Relations between Nasdaq
market makers and SOES firms became very strained. See id. at A-57. The SEC found
that the NASD responded to market maker complaints about SOES firms by heightening
enforcement activity against such firms and by using admissions processes to limit the ad-
mission and activities of potential SOES firms. See id. at A-67 to A-68, A-72.
98. See Manning & Wilmer, supra note 97, at 967-68.
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SEC settlement, NASD was required to spend $100 million dollars on
enforcement and surveillance improvements for the Nasdaq market.99
B. Internet-Based Securities Trading
In a significant departure from the institutionalized, well-established
trading practices of the NYSE and Nasdaq,1 the SEC granted no-action
relief to several companies attempting to provide liquidity for securities
via the Internet.'0 ' The SEC no-action process provides requesting par-
ties with the SEC staff's enforcement position regarding certain factual
scenarios, or with the staff's interpretation of rules and statutes in the
context of a specified transaction."2 The SEC staff position usually is
conveyed in the form of a no-action or an interpretive letter.'Y3 Through
no-action and interpretive letters, the SEC allowed for securities trading
on the Internet' In most instances of the SEC's Internet-based securi-
99. See id. at 967.
100. See supra Parts I.A.I-I.A.2 (discussing the operations of the NYSE and the
Nasdaq market).
101. See Cella & Stark, supra note 11, at 829 (discussing important no-action letters
pertaining to Internet-based securities trading systems); see also supra Parts I.B.1-I.B.3
(discussing significant SEC positions regarding Internet-based trading systems).
102. See Thomas P. Lemke, The SEC No-Action Letter Process, 42 BuS. LAW. 1019,
1022 (1987) (detailing the procedural requirements of the no-action request process).
103. See id. (describing the difference between no-action and interpretive letters). No-
action letters analyze specific transactions, while interpretive letters analyze specific rules,
statutes, or regulations as they apply to certain fact patterns. See 1 Loss & SELIGMAN,
supra note 22, at 525 n.29. No-action letters inform the recipient whether the SEC would
bring enforcement action if a specified transaction occurred. See id. No-action and inter-
pretive letters are not binding on the SEC, however, because they are issued by the SEC
staff, not the full Commission. See id. But see Lemke, supra note 102, at 1042 (stating
that, although the SEC has cautioned that it is not bound by no-action letters, the recipient
of a favorable no-action response can be "fairly certain" that the letter will be binding).
The estoppel effect of no-action letters has not been decided upon by the courts. See id.
Although no-action letters are issued more frequently than interpretive letters, it is often
very difficult to distinguish between the two types of letters because no-action letters often
include SEC interpretations of the applicable law. See id. at 1022. Due to the informal
nature of the no-action process, the differentiation between no-action and interpretive let-
ters is not essential. See id. (analyzing the difference between no-action and interpretive
letters). See generally Lewis D. Lowenfels, SEC No-Action Letters: Conflicts with Existing
Statutes, Cases and Commission Releases, 59 VA. L. REV. 303 (1973) (discussing the im-
pact of no-action letters on other forms of SEC regulation); Lewis D. Lowenfels, SEC
"No-Action" Letters: Some Problems and Suggested Approaches, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1256
(1971) (describing generally the no-action letter process).
104. See generally Recent Agency Action, SEC Allows Internet-Based Trading of Se-
curities, 110 HARV. L. REV. 959 (1996) [hereinafter Recent Agency Action] (discussing
specifically the no-action relief granted by the SEC to Real Goods Trading Corporation);
see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, § 6.01 (describing some of the no-action letters issued by
the SEC in connection with Internet-based trading systems).
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ties trading approval, companies requested that the SEC staff not rec-
ommend enforcement action by the SEC if the companies created Inter-
net Web sites for securities trading.105 In one instance, however, the SEC
stepped in, without receiving a no-action request, to provide an interpre-
tive letter to a company that was utilizing the Internet to sell its securi-
ties.1 6
Web sites allowed the issuing companies to provide information re-
garding the sale of their securities and contained bulletin boards on
which investors could post their interest in purchasing or selling such se-
curities.'07 Regulating in a entirely new area, the SEC responded affirma-
tively in its no-action and interpretive letters. Gradually, through the no-
action process, the SEC developed an informal regulatory framework to
address the issues raised by Internet-based securities trading."' Unfortu-
nately, however, a lack of cohesive and predictable regulation remains.
1. Spring Street Brewing: The Beer Flows, and So Too Does the Stock
The first securities offering on the Internet arose in connection with an
initial public offering (IPO)1 °9 by Spring Street Brewing Company, a New
York based microbrewery." ° Spring Street Brewing desired to sell secu-
rities on the Internet in order to gain access to investor funding that
105. See infra notes 109-44 and accompanying text (describing the plans of several is-
suers that wanted to create Internet Web sites in order to offer securities to the public).
"A Web site is the space on a server occupied by the information maintained by a com-
pany or individual." Cella & Stark, supra note 11, at 821 n.33 (citing CRICKET LiU ET AL.,
MANAGING INTERNET INFORMATION SERVICES 309-10 (1994)). The Web site occupies
multiple "pages," the first of which is the "home" page. See id.
106. See Spring Street Brewing Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [Current Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) i 77,201, at 77,001 (Apr. 17, 1996) [hereinafter Spring Street
No-Action Letter]. Although the Spring Street Brewing letter appears to be a no-action
letter, it is actually an interpretive letter. See id. at 77,002 (stating that the SEC believes
that interpretive advice was most appropriate in this situation). Spring Street Brewing had
actually begun trading securities on its Web site without first seeking no-action relief from
the SEC and, thus, the SEC offered its interpretive advice following its suspension of
Spring Street Brewing's trading activity. See id. at 77,001; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note
1, at 6-2 n.5 (noting that the issuance of an interpretive letter, as opposed to a no-action
letter, by the SEC is highly unusual).
107. See Celia & Stark, supra note 11, at 829 (discussing the SEC's position regarding
what types of activities are appropriate within Internet Web sites involved in securities
offerings); see also infra notes 109-44 and accompanying text (explaining the SEC no-
action letters regarding Internet-based trading systems).
108. See Celia & Stark, supra note 11, at 829 (describing the SEC's requirements, as
set forth in no-action letters, regarding Internet-based trading systems).
109. An "initial public offering" is defined as a "corporation's first offering of stock to
the public." DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 18, at 260.
110. See Spring Street No-Action Letter, supra note 106, at 77,001.
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would otherwise be beyond the company's reach due to its limited reve-
nue.' Without greater access to investor funding, the IPO either would
fail or never occur. Spring Street Brewing, therefore, established a Web
site allowing investors to access SEC-required disclosure materials and to
purchase the company's securities.1 Following the IPO, Spring Street
Brewing expanded its Internet-based services, adding another page to its
Web site that enabled buyers and sellers of Spring Street Brewing stock
to execute trades. Spring Street Brewing, in effect, had created a sec-
ondary market for its stock wholly outside the exchanges or the OTC
market.
114
After several weeks of operation, the SEC asked Spring Street Brew-
ing to suspend the trading system's operations. The trading halt gave
the SEC staff time to determine if the trading system complied with fed-
eral securities laws."6 After reviewing the Spring Street Brewing trading
system, the SEC issued its findings in the form of an interpretive letter. 
1
7
In this letter, the SEC staff provided suggestions as to how Spring Street
Brewing could operate the trading system within the bounds of the fed-
eral securities laws."' First, the SEC staff found that the company should
utilize an independent agent for the receipt and processing of investor
funds.1 9 Second, information should have been provided to investors re-
111. See id.
112. See Gavis, supra note 4, at 337-38 (1996) (describing the Spring Street Brewing
trading system and the SEC's response thereto).
113. See id. at 337 (discussing the secondary market for trading that Spring Street
Brewing established following its successful IPO on the Internet).
114. See id. Spring Street Brewing set up a system called Wit-Trade, comprised of two
bulletin boards. See id. One bulletin board contained a listing of buyers and the amounts
that they were willing to pay. See id. The other listed sellers and the price that they were
requesting. See id. Buyers and sellers that found each other on Wit-Trade contacted each
other through electronic mail. See id. Spring Street Brewing handled the delivery of funds
and stock certificates. See id.
115. See id. (stating that the SEC was concerned with various compliance aspects of
Spring Street Brewing's Internet trading system).
116. See id. (describing the SEC's concern that the Spring Street Brewing trading sys-
tem was operating in violation of certain 1934 Act requirements).
117. See Spring Street No-Action Letter, supra note 106, at 77,001-02 (stating, in an
interpretive letter, the SEC's position regarding the Wit-Trade system); see also supra note
105 and accompanying text (describing how the SEC issued an interpretive letter instead
of a no-action letter after suspending the trading of the Wit-Trade system).
118. See Spring Street No-Action Letter, supra note 106, at 77,001-02 (describing the
requirements that the SEC imposed before Spring Street Brewing could continue opera-
tion of Wit-Trade).
119. See id. at 77,001 (explaining the SEC's position with regard to Wit-Trade's han-
dling of investor/seller funds). The SEC suggested that Spring Street Brewing Company
utilize the services of a bank or an escrow agent in order to process investor and seller
102919981
Catholic University Law Review
garding the inherent dangers of investing in illiquid securities.12° Third,
investors should have been informed that they were subject to regulation
as broker-dealers if they posted listings on both the "buy" and "sell"
bulletin boards within the trading system.12 Lastly, the SEC warned
Spring Street Brewing that unless an available exemption existed, the
company would likely have to register the trading system under the 1933
Act."' Registration under the 1933 Act entails a burdensome series of
registration and reporting requirements for companies, especially for
small companies such as Spring Street Brewing. 123
funds. See id.
In a traditional securities trading scenario, a clearing agency would act as an intermedi-
ary for the making of payments and delivery of securities. See COX ET AL., supra note 10,
at 30. Clearing agencies are one of the four types of self-regulating entities recognized in
the 1934 Act. See id. at 29. Congress created registered clearing agencies in response to a
crisis in the 1960s and 1970s, during which long delays occurred in the stock transfer and
payment process. See id. at 30. The congressional response was Section 17A of the 1934
Act, which established clearing agencies as SROS, and created minimum standards for
their operation and membership. See id. The largest registered clearing agency is the Na-
tional Securities Clearing Corporation, formed through the combination of subsidiaries of
the NYSE, Amex, and the NASD. See id.
120. "Liquidity" is defined and explained as the
[A]bility to buy or sell an asset quickly and in large volume without substantially
affecting the asset's price. Shares in large blue-chip stocks like General Motors
or General Electric are liquid, because they are actively traded and therefore the
stock price will not be dramatically moved by a few buy or sell orders. However,
shares in small companies with few shares outstanding.., generally are not con-
sidered liquid, because one or two big orders can move the price up or down
sharply.
DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 18, at 305. In its interpretive letter to Spring Street
Brewing, the SEC required that the company notify investors that "there is no guarantee
that they will be able to sell the Company's shares at the price they paid for them, or at
any particular published indication of interest." Spring Street No-Action Letter, supra
note 106, at 77,001. The SEC also required Spring Street Brewing to inform investors that
the company's securities are not traded on a national securities exchange or Nasdaq. See
id.
121. See Spring Street No-Action Letter, supra note 106, at 77,001-02 (explaining that
users would be required to register as brokers if they acted as both buyers and sellers of
Spring Street Brewing stock on the Wit-Trade bulletin boards). The 1934 Act requires
brokers and dealers to register with the SEC. See POSER, supra note 6, at 3-3. Once regis-
tered with the SEC, brokers and dealers are subject to SEC authority over certain aspects
of their business, including the supervision of personnel, financial responsibility, and the
maintenance of corporate books and records. See id.
122. See Spring Street No-Action Letter, supra note 106, at 77,002 (stating that the of-
fering of securities on Wit-Trade resembled an "offer or sale" for purposes of the 1933 Act
registration requirements). The SEC provided guidance to Spring Street Brewing, how-
ever, in the form of notice regarding available exemptions from the 1933 Act's registration
requirements. See id.; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at § 6.03 (discussing the 1933
Act's registration requirements as they apply to Internet-based trading systems).
123. See JOHNSON & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 15, at 5-9 (discussing the myriad of
requirements imposed upon corporate securities issuers by the 1933 Act). Because the
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Although the SEC staff's interpretive guidance to Spring Street
Brewing appears restrictive, the SEC reviewed the trading system's ac-
tivities with an open mind.'24 In fact, the SEC staff specifically noted that
"[i]nnovation and creativity are the hallmark of our nation's securities
markets," and that the Spring Street Brewing system was an "innovative
mechanism" for providing shareholders with greater liquidity. "
2. Real Goods Trading Corporation: Passive Trading in an Aggressive
Market
Following the Spring Street Brewing letter, the SEC soon found itself
faced with another opportunity to review a proposed Internet based se-
curities trading system."6 In June 1996, Real Goods Trading Corporation
(RGTC) requested no-action relief from the SEC in connection with its
proposal to establish a "passive" Internet bulletin board.' 27 RGTC es-
tablished this bulletin board to provide information to prospective buy-
ers and sellers of RGTC's stock.' RGTC's sole role in the passive trad-
ing system would be to provide information describing the securities.'
The SEC staff granted RGTC's request not to register the trading sys-
tem with the SEC in any capacity.' 30 In doing so, the SEC staff again set
1933 Act is considered to be a "disclosure statute," it requires detailed public reporting of
information concerning the business and finances of the issuer. See id. at 6. The informa-
tion that is disclosed by the company is made public by the SEC in order to allow investors
to have access to material information regarding the issuer and the issuance. See id.
124. See Spring Street No-Action Letter, supra note 106, at 77,001 (stating that the
SEC tries to encourage modernization within the nation's securities markets, but that the
agency is primarily concerned with protecting investors).
125. Id.
126. See RGTC No-Action Letter, supra note 29, at 77,134 (providing the SEC staff's
reply to a no-action request letter regarding an Internet-based securities trading system).
127. See id. at 77,131. A passive Internet trading system uses bulletin boards to list
information regarding stock for sale or purchase. See id. The term "passive" is used be-
cause the system and its operators do not get involved in the actual trading of the securi-
ties. See id. at 77,132. Instead, the buyers and sellers of stock obtain the information they
need from the bulletin boards, and then effectuate the transaction by direct contact with
each other outside of the system. See id. Even though RGTC would not be involved in
the transaction, the company was required to keep records of the stock price quotations
for a minimum of three years to be made available to the SEC and to the Pacific Stock Ex-
change upon request. See id.; see also Gerard R. Boyce, Internet Stock Trading and the
SEC, N.Y. L.J., July 11, 1996, at 5 (providing a detailed analysis of the RGTC trading sys-
tem and the related SEC no-action letter).
128. See RGTC No-Action Letter, supra note 29, at 77,131 (discussing the parameters
of the RGTC bulletin board trading system).
129. See id. at 77,132 (stating that RGTC would have no role in the buy/sell transac-
tion beyond providing information to investors about the company's stock).
130. See id. at 77,134 (providing the SEC staff's favorable response to RGTC).
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forth guidelines for the operation of the system. 3' First, RGTC was not
to receive compensation for the use of the Web site. 132 Second, the SEC
staff stated that RGTC could not become directly or indirectly involved
in any negotiations taking place on the bulletin board.'33 Third, the SEC
staff forbid RGTC from providing information regarding the advisability
of buying or selling securities.134 Lastly, RGTC could not receive, trans-
fer, or hold funds or securities in connection with the bulletin board.1
35
With regard to the last requirement, the SEC staff did not provide any
guidance on the settlement procedures to be used by the trading partici-
pants.'36 In the months following the RGTC no-action letter, the SEC
provided similar relief to other issuers using systems similar to
RGTCs.3 7
3. Internet Capital Corporation: It's All in the Name
After the RGTC no-action letter, the SEC staff granted no-action re-
lief to Internet Capital Corporation (ICC), a third party offering Inter-
net-based securities trading services to issuing companies. 38 In this no-
131. See id. (detailing the SEC staff's guidelines for the operation of RGTC's trading
system).
132. See id. (describing the SEC's position prohibiting RGTC from receiving any com-
pensation for its efforts in establishing and operating the trading system).
133. See id. (stating that RGTC would be prohibited from taking an active role in the
trading between stock buyers and sellers).
134. See id. (finding that RGTC would be prohibited from advising transaction par-
ticipants in connection with the buying or selling of RGTC stock).
135. See id. (describing the SEC's position that RGTC would be prohibited from han-
dling investor/seller funds).
136. See id. (requiring that RGTC not handle funds, but remaining silent on how par-
ticipants should settle their transactions).
137. See PerfectData No-Action Letter, supra note 29, at *5-7 (involving a computer
accessory company that established an Internet-based bulletin board trading system);
Flamemaster No-Action Letter, supra note 29, at *5-6 (involving an aircraft sealant com-
pany that established an Internet-based bulletin to facilitate trading in its stock). The SEC
staff stated that it would no longer respond to no-action requests with respect to systems
similar to RGTC's because the staff already expressed its opinion on the applicability of
1934 Act requirements to such systems. See id. at *6.
138. See Internet Capital No-Action Letter, supra note 29, at *1 (involving a third
party Internet Web site designed to allow numerous corporate issuers facilitate securities
trading transactions with investors). In an earlier, similar no-action letter, the SEC staff
granted relief to Angel Capital Electronic Network (Ace-Net), a conglomerate of universi-
ties and non-profit entities that proposed to establish a Web site listing small corporate
offerings. See Angel Capital No-Action Letter, supra note 32, at *1. The Office of Advo-
cacy of the U.S. Small Business Administration sponsored Ace-Net with the understand-
ing that Ace-Net would become a private, independent, not-for-profit organization once
fully operational. See Angel Capital Electronic Network, Ace-Net (visited Feb. 12, 1998)
<https://ace-net.sr.unh.edu/what/>.
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action letter, the SEC staff allowed ICC to post and deliver prospectuses
and offering materials for unaffiliated corporate issuers whose offerings
were SEC-registered.13 9 ICC proposed to offer its service to issuing com-
panies in need of investment capital, but lacking sufficient assets to pur-
sue traditional underwriting activities associated with offerings.
1'4
ICC clearly stated in its SEC no-action request letter that the company
would act simply as a "delivery mechanism," not a broker-dealer, agent,
or underwriter for the issuing companies, and that ICC would have no
involvement in the transactions following the delivery of a prospectus.1
4
1
Furthermore, ICC stated that it would only receive a flat fee, not a com-
mission, from its corporate issuer clients, and that it would not offer any
The drafters of Ace-Net's request for no-action relief noted two substantial obstacles
that a small company confronts. See Angel Capital No-Action Letter, supra note 32, at *2.
First, the company had "limited exposure to experienced, accredited investors." See id.
Second, the company faced costly transaction fees associated with obtaining equity capital.
See id. The SEC staff's no-action relief provided that the trading system could operate as
long as Ace-Net did not: (1) provide advice about the merits of particular opportunities;
(2) receive compensation other than flat fees to cover administrative costs; (3) participate
in negotiations; (4) directly assist investors or listing companies with the closing of any
transaction; (5) handle funds or securities; or (6) hold itself out as providing securities-
related services other than a listing or matching service. See id. at *8.
In a separate no-action letter, the SEC staff granted relief to another company named
"Internet Capital Corporation" (ICC-2). See Reid & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1104 at *1 (Dec. 22, 1997). ICC-2 requested SEC relief to establish
an Internet-based trading system for companies whose stock was already listed in a trading
market. See id. at "1. ICC-2 would charge its corporate issuer clients a one time flat fee in
exchange for its services, which would include: (1) a separate page on ICC-2's Web site for
each corporate issuer with direct links to the issuer's SEC filings and detailed information
about the issuer and its offering; (2) price quote for each company derived from the ex-
change on which the issuer's securities trade, or from Nasdaq; and (3) periodic newsletters.
See id. at *2-4.
The SEC staff approved ICC-2's trading system as long as ICC-2: (1) provided proper
disclaimers, as described in the no-action letter; (2) continually verified that each issuer
was a member of a national exchange or Nasdaq; (3) maintained proper records for SEC
inspection; (4) complied with the advertising restrictions set forth in the requesting letter;
and (5) only executed trades on the system when in compliance with the federal securities
laws. See id. at *9-10. Furthermore, the SEC staff prohibited ICC-2 from: (1) receiving
transaction-related compensation for the system; (2) participating in negotiations; (3) of-
fering advice; (4) receiving, transferring, or holding funds or securities incidental to oper-
ating the system; and (5) referring participants to a third party for clearing or settling a
transaction (other than a bank approved under § 3(a)(6) of the 1934 Act). See id. at *10.
139. See Internet Capital No-Action Letter, supra note 29, at *1, *5. ICC's Internet
Web site, the Internet Capital Financial Forum, is located at <http://www.inetcapital.com>.
140. See Internet Capital No-Action Letter, supra note 29, at *4 (discussing the types
of issuing companies that ICC wanted to enlist for its Internet-based securities trading sys-
tem).
141. See id. at *8, *10.
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investment advice.'42 Finally, ICC would require the issuers to covenant
that they would comply with all federal and state laws. 43
Taken together, these recent no-action and interpretive letters repre-
sent a system of tenuous SEC regulation in connection with Internet-
based trading systems. At a minimum, the decisions reflect the SEC's
desire to allow innovative securities trading systems to depart from tradi-
tional methods existing within exchanges such as the NYSE and
Nasdaq."'
II. THE SEC RESPONDS: CONCEPTUAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS
FOR ALTERNATIVE TRADING SYSTEMS
Faced with the continued creation and expansion of alternative securi-
ties trading systems, the SEC realized the need for a coherent regulatory
framework to ensure fairness and stability in the securities markets.45
For this reason, and because the SEC operates under a congressional
mandate to establish more efficient and effective market operations,'46
the SEC published a concept release (Release) on June 4, 1997.47 In the
142. See id. at *8-10.
143. See id. at *10.
144. See Spring Street No-Action Letter, supra note 106, at 77,001 (stating expressly
that the SEC tries to encourage modernization within the nation's securities markets).
The SEC stated that "[i]nnovation and creativity" were instrumental in the creation of the
United States securities markets, and that such advances created "the most efficient capi-
tal formation system in the world." Id.; see also supra Part I.B.2 and I.B.3 (discussing the
SEC staff's positions regarding certain Internet-based securities trading systems); supra
Parts I.A.1.-I.A.2 (describing the traditional methods of trading on the NYSE and
Nasdaq).
145. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,486 (noting that technological
changes imposed significant challenges for the federal securities law regulatory frame-
work). The SEC noted that the exponential growth of trading systems offering viable al-
ternatives to traditional stock exchanges has highlighted the need for "forward-looking,
flexible" regulation. See id.
146. See 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(2) (1994) (directing the SEC to establish a "national
market system" for securities). In requiring the SEC to establish a national market sys-
tem, Congress found that "data processing and communications techniques create the op-
portunity for more efficient and effective stock market operations." Id. § 78k-l(a)(1)(B).
147. Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,485. The SEC issued the Release for
the express purpose of soliciting comments regarding the regulation of alternative trading
systems, national securities exchanges, and foreign market activities in the United States.
See id. Throughout this Comment, the Release is analyzed only for its suggestions re-
garding alternative trading systems and national securities exchanges. The SEC has issued
an interpretive release regarding the applicability of federal registration requirements
upon Internet Web sites that disseminate information on offshore securities sales. See
Statement of the Commission Regarding Use of Internet Web Sites, International Series
Release No. 1125, 63 Fed. Reg. 14,806 (Mar. 27, 1998). For a discussion of the jurisdic-
tional issues presented when mutual funds are marketed on the Internet, see Tim Herring-
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Release, the SEC suggested two alternative frameworks designed to
modify the regulation of alternative trading systems' 4  As a guiding
principle in the Release, the SEC sought to create the most efficient sys-
tem to promote market-wide transparency, protect investors, and pro-
vide fairness in trading. 9
The two alternatives outlined in the Release seek to incorporate alter-
native trading systems, which under the Release's definition would in-
clude Internet-based exchanges, into the existing federal securities law
purview.' While both alternatives are more efficient than the current
no-action letter system, they differ dramatically in concept.' The first
alternative suggests a system of continued broker-dealer regulation com-
bined with regulatory modifications.' The second alternative advocates
a wholesale restructuring of exchange regulation accomplished by rede-
fining the term "exchange."' 53 Although both alternatives exhibit a de-
sire to adapt to changing technology, a close analysis reveals that the al-
ternatives lack the comprehensive regulatory structure necessary for the
effective monitoring of alternative trading systems.5 Proper regulation
and facilitation of alternative trading systems can best be achieved
through a different, yet easily ascertainable alternative: the creation of a
new national securities association. 55
ton, Marketing Funds on the Internet, 25 INT'L BUS. LAW. 340 (1997).
148. Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,487 (discussing the two frameworks
suggested by the SEC).
149. See id. "Market-wide transparency" generally refers to a situation where inves-
tors and sellers of stock have access to the best and most accurate price quotations avail-
able for an individual stock, no matter where the trade is executed. See id. at 30,492-93.
150. See id. at 30,487.
151. See supra notes 145-50 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 156-91 and ac-
companying text (describing in detail the Release's two suggested regulatory alternatives).
Although not expressly mentioned in the Release, another possible method of regulating
non-traditional trading systems would be to amend the federal securities statutes dealing
with exchanges to expressly provide for alternative trading systems. See Junius W. Peake,
Comments to SEC Concept Release on Regulation of Exchanges (visited Sept. 10, 1997)
<http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s71697/peakel.htm> (responding to the Release's third
question). However, the time involved in amending the provisions, as well as the relative
power of competing interests, could mire this approach indefinitely. See id. (responding to
the Release's 23rd question).
152. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,487 (describing generally the
first alternative suggested by the Release).
153. See id. (discussing the second alternative suggested by the Release). For a de-
tailed discussion of the alternatives suggested in the Release, see infra notes 156-91 and
accompanying text.
154. See infra Part III (discussing various shortcomings of the two proposals set forth
in the Release).
155. See infra Part V (proposing the creation of a new national securities association
for alternative trading systems).
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A. Continued Regulation of Alternative Trading Systems as Broker-
Dealers
The Release's first alternative framework calls for the continued
regulation of alternative trading systems as broker-dealers.156 Broker-
dealers must comply with various aspects of the 1934 Act, including a
system of registration and reporting requirements.' Furthermore, bro-
ker-dealers are subject to the regulations imposed by their supervising
SROs"'
The first alternative would allow the SEC to devise special rules for al-
ternative trading systems that would operate in conjunction with the ex-
isting body of broker-dealer regulation 9 Specifically, the Release sug-
gested requiring SROs to subject alternative trading systems to the
jurisdiction of the SRO's real-time surveillance system.16 This would al-
low the SROs to police the new markets for both fraud and manipula-
tion."' The SEC also would require SROs to create new market surveil-
lance controls that would work specifically with the technology of the
new trading systems. 62 The first alternative further demands that alter-
native trading systems provide a more complete audit trail to their SROs,
156. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,495 (discussing how the SEC
could integrate alternative trading systems into the established regulatory framework
through broker-dealer regulation).
157. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (referencing generally the federal se-
curities laws requirements imposed upon broker-dealers). See generally 6 Loss &
SELIGMAN, supra note 22, at 2965-3103 (describing the federal securities law requirements
as they apply to broker-dealers). Violations of federal securities laws are punishable by
civil and criminal penalties. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 19, at 546. When the SEC uncovers
a possible criminal violation of the federal securities laws, it relinquishes jurisdiction to the
United States Department of Justice. See id. In addition, the SEC is empowered under
the 1934 Act to hold administrative hearings in its supervisory role over broker-dealers.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (1994). See generally Gregory S. Crespi, The Reach of the Fed-
eral Registration Requirements for Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisors, 17 SEC. REG.
L.J. 339 (1990) (summarizing administrative and judicial interpretations of federal statu-
tory registration requirements); David A. Lipton, A Primer on Broker-Dealer Registration,
36 CATH. U. L. REV. 899 (1987) (analyzing the fundamentals of federal broker-dealer
registration requirements); Arthur F. Mathews, Criminal Prosecutions Under the Federal
Securities Laws and Related Statutes: The Nature and Development of SEC Criminal Cases,
39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 901 (1971) (detailing the development of SEC criminal cases).
158. See generally 6-7 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 22, at 2965-3400 (detailing the
system of broker-dealer regulation, including the role of SROs in overseeing broker-
dealer activity).
159. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,487.
160. See id. (discussing the surveillance of alternative trading systems); see also supra
note 70 and accompanying text (describing the NYSE's Stock Watch system).
161. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,487 (discussing the need for sur-
veillance of alternative trading systems).
162. See id.
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detailing the flow of transactions through each system.163 These measures
would enable the SEC to ensure a higher degree of investor protection
and market stability as required by the 1934 Act.64
The Release maintains a strong desire to further the goals of the 1934
Act, while at the same time successfully incorporating alternative trading
systems into the domain of the federal securities laws.1 6 ' To this end, the
first alternative suggests that new trading systems assist the SROs in
market surveillance activities, as well as adopt their own rules and proce-
dures aimed at ensuring system integrity.' 66 Furthermore, the Release
posits that alternative trading systems be required to make all orders in
their systems available to a supervising SRO.'67 Recognizing its congres-
sional mandate to ensure timely and adequate disclosure, the SEC would
161require the SRO to promulgate the orders on a public quotation sys-
tem. 169 In addition, the SEC suggested that it could require operators of
alternative trading systems to allow the public to access the systems for
the purpose of interacting with posted orders. Such requirements
would ensure fair trading practices, while simultaneously increasing mar-
ket competition."'
163. See id. at 30,495-96. By providing SROs with more extensive audit information,
alternative trading systems would facilitate SRO oversight. See id. at 30,496. Further-
more, the audit information would enable the SROs to integrate alternative trading sys-
tems into their surveillance programs. See id.
164. See id. at 30,495-96 (discussing the market surveillance problems inherent in al-
ternative trading systems, and the possible solutions); supra note 19 (referencing the 1934
Act's mandate regarding investor protection and market stability).
165. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,486 (discussing the problems
with the application of existing law to alternative trading systems, and the need to incor-
porate those systems more fully into a regulatory scheme).
166. See id. at 30,487 (describing the SEC's intention to incorporate market surveil-
lance procedures into alternative trading system regulation).
167. See id.
168. "Order" is defined in the Release as "any firm trading interest, including both
limit orders and market maker quotations." Id. at 30,486 n.2.
169. See id. at 30,495-96 (discussing the SEC's suggested inclusion of alternative trad-
ing system stock quotation within publicly accessible quotation systems).
170. See id. at 30,495 (stating that the SEC could require the operators of alternative
trading systems to allow public interaction).
171. See id. at 30,496. The SEC has found that existing alternative trading systems op-
erated by broker-dealers do not sufficiently disclose information to the public, thereby ex-
cluding the public from material information needed to ensure fairness in the market. See
id. The SEC posits that better public disclosure mechanisms will increase competition and
transparency in the market. See id. Therefore, the Release requires that alternative trad-
ing systems incorporate disclosure mechanisms so that information regarding trading in-
terest, prices, and volume will be made widely available to market participants. See id.
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B. The Tiered Approach to Exchange Regulation
The SEC's second alternative framework involved a general expansion
of the regulation of securities exchanges.7 Under this approach, ex-
changes would be grouped into three tiers, with each tier containing dif-
ferent methods and levels of regulation .' The Release stated that a
tiered system of exchange regulation could be implemented through a
redefinition of the term "exchange.', 7 4 The first tier of exchanges would
incorporate the majority of alternative trading systems already in opera-
tion at the time of the Release.' The Release suggested limiting partici-
pants in the first tier to companies that either (1) had a limited volume,
or (2) did not create listing prices.'76 If an alternative trading system sat-
isfied one of these standards, then under the terms set forth in the Re-
lease, the system would likely be exempt from formal registration with
the SEC as a national securities exchange.7
The second tier of proposed exchanges would include alternative
trading systems that experienced higher trading volume than those in the
first tier."8 The Release called for these systems to be regulated as na-tional securities exchanges, but in a modified manner.179 In this tier, the
172. See id. at 30,499.
173. See id. at 30,487.
174. See id.
175. Cf. id. (discussing the requirements for, and types of, first tier exchanges); see also
supra Parts I.B.1-I.B.3 (discussing alternative trading systems that already have been pre-
sented to the SEC).
176. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,487 (detailing the first tier of ex-
changes that would be established under the Release's second regulatory alternative).
177. See id. at 30,487, 30,500. The 1934 Act provides an exemption from registration
for exchanges if, in the SEC's opinion, the limited volume on these exchanges does not
warrant registration as national exchanges under § 78f of the 1934 Act. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78e (1994). Section 78f of the 1934 Act deals with the registration of national securities
associations. Id. § 78f. In 1997, only one exchange, known as AZX, was exempted by the
SEC from registration as a national exchange due to its light volume. See Regulation of
Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,490 n.24; see also Self-Regulatory Organizations; Wunsch
Auction Systems, Inc.; Order Granting Limited Volume Exemption from Registration as
an Exchange Under Section 5 of the Securities Exchange Act, Release No. 34-28899, 56
Fed. Reg. 8377 (1991) (granting an exemption to Wunsch Auction Systems, Inc., now
known as AZX). The 1934 Act authorizes the SEC to "conditionally or unconditionally
exempt any person, security, or transaction, or any class [thereof]," from any provision of
the 1934 Act or rule thereunder, as long as the exemption is "necessary or appropriate" to
protect investors or the public interest. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78mm (West 1997).
178. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,487 (noting that these exchanges
more closely resemble traditional exchanges).
179. Id. at 30,487 (discussing the proposed regulation of second tier exchanges as na-
tional securities exchanges with appropriate exemptions).
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SEC would have used its exemptive authority ' to modify any 1934 Act
registration and regulatory requirements that would be unduly burden-
some on alternative trading systems."" To determine what 1934 Act ex-
emptions are necessary for a particular qualified trading system, the SEC
would have been required to thoroughly review the characteristics and
structure of each system. 82
The third and final tier of exchanges would have included traditional
183exchanges. The SEC would continue to regulate these traditional secu-
rities markets as national exchanges pursuant to the 1934 Act.'1 In an
attempt to facilitate the competitiveness of traditional exchanges, the
Release suggested that the SEC could utilize its exemptive authority to
reduce unnecessary regulatory requirements imposed upon the tradi-
tional exchanges by the federal securities laws.'85 Other than these ex-
180. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (discussing the general exemptive
powers that Congress granted to the SEC in the National Securities Markets Improvement
Act of 1996). Congress granted the SEC this exemptive authority with respect to the 1933
Act in order to allow the agency to consider more flexible approaches to registration, dis-
closure, and related issues. See JAMES HAMILTON, SECURITIES REFORM: NATIONAL
SECURITIES MARKETS IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1996, at 19 (1996) (discussing generally the
SEC's increased exemptive authority under the 1996 Act). Congress authorized the SEC
to act by rule or regulation with respect to 1933 Act exemptions. See id. The SEC was
authorized to act through orders and rulemaking with respect to 1934 Act exemptions.
See id. Read literally, the new exemptive powers appear to allow the SEC to exempt per-
sons or transactions from any rule. Congress, however, has noted expressly that the ex-
emptive authority did not apply to the anti-fraud provisions in the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
See id. Moreover, Congress specifically referred to alternative trading systems in its con-
sideration of the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996. See S. REP. No.
104-293, at 15 (1996); see also Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,499 (discussing
how the SEC could use its exemptive authority to create a tiered approach to exchange
definition and regulation).
181. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78mm (creating broad exemptive power for the SEC); see also
Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,499 (discussing how the SEC could utilize its
exemptive authority to create a new category of exchanges).
182. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,502 (describing how the SEC
could consider exempting alternative markets from certain statutory and regulatory re-
quirements).
183. See id. at 30,487.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 30,516 (discussing how a re-evaluation of market regulation due to the
rise in alternative trading systems could benefit traditional exchanges). In the Release, the
SEC expressed concern for traditional exchanges due to the increased popularity of alter-
native trading systems that could provide similar services at lower costs or with superior
efficiency. See id. For example, the Release noted that burdensome 1934 Act require-
ments regarding SEC approval of exchange rule changes could be streamlined in order to
expedite the review process, thereby making exchange rulemaking more efficient. See id.
at 30,518. The SEC would not, however, make any exemptions that would sacrifice "in-
vestor protection or market integrity." See id. at 30,516.
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emptions, the third tier exchanges would have continued to operate as
traditional national securities exchanges under the 1934 Act.
186
The SEC suggested in the Release that the tiered approach to ex-
change regulation could best be effectuated by modifying the definition
of "exchange."' 87 The new definition suggested by the SEC was "any or-
ganization that both: (1) consolidates orders of multiple parties; and (2)
provides a facility through which, or sets material conditions under
which, participants entering such orders may agree to the terms of a
trade."' 8 Due to the current narrow definition of "exchange,"' 89 many
non-traditional trading systems are not required to register as exchanges,
and instead have been registered as broker-dealers.'9 By redefining the
term "exchange," the SEC hoped to incorporate existing alternative
trading systems more adequately into its regulatory framework, and to
allow for the easy incorporation of future non-traditional trading sys-
tems.'91
III. THE REACH OF THE RELEASE AND THE CONTINUED SEARCH FOR
REASONABLE REGULATION
In this era of daily technological advances, the SEC's Release was a
timely reaction to the needs of the securities industry. 92 The SEC's posi-
186. See id. at 30,487.
187. See id. at 30,487, 30,505-06 (discussing the definitional history of the SEC's term
"exchange" and its effect on various alternative trading systems).
188. Id. at 30,507 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). The SEC asserted that this
new definition would more closely resemble the 1934 Act's concept of "bringing together"
buyers and sellers. See id. More importantly, the SEC felt that the new definition would
broaden the SEC's concept of what is typically understood to be an exchange. See id. By
broadening this concept, the new definition of exchange would reflect global changes in
securities markets brought on by automated trading. See id.
189. See supra note 44 (providing the 1934 Act's definition of "exchange").
190. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,505-06; see also Self-Regulatory
Organizations; Delta Government Options Corp.; Order Granting Temporary Registra-
tion as a Clearing Agency, Release No. 34-27611, 55 Fed. Reg. 1890 (1990) (granting relief
from SEC enforcement action to a government securities trading system because the sys-
tem did not meet the definition of "exchange"). The Seventh Circuit upheld the SEC's
authority to utilize a narrow definition of exchange. See Board of Trade of Chicago v.
SEC, 923 F.2d 1270, 1273 (7th Cir. 1991).
191. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,486 (stating that the SEC is at-
tempting to be forward-looking in its regulatory approach).
192. See Securities Industry Association, krongarl.htm (visited Oct. 17, 1997)
<http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s71697/krongarl.htm>. The Securities Industry Asso-
ciation (SIA) represents the interests of more than 770 securities firms in North America.
See id. (describing SIA in footnote one of the SIA's comments in response to the Release).
In the summary to its comments regarding the Release, SIA applauded the SEC for its
timely effort to provide possible directions for future market regulation. See id In addi-
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tions in previous no-action letters regarding Internet-based trading, al-
though ad hoc in nature, evidenced a desire to foster innovative trading
procedures."' The Release further bolstered this desire.'94 Despite criti-
cism from various scholars and practitioners,' 9' the SEC should be com-
mended for its forward-thinking and accommodating approach towards
196alternative trading systems. However, a mere desire to foster innova-
tive trading practices does not necessarily mean that the ideas set forth in
the Release should be blindly accepted.'9 Indeed, both alternatives pre-
sented in the Release are subject to criticism. Moreover, the SEC men-
tioned, but failed to fully explore, certain creative options available
within the 1934 Act framework.'9 These creative statutory and regula-
tory alternatives would allow for efficient, fair, and safe regulation of the
tion, SIA pointed out in the introduction to its comments that investors will turn to other
sources, including cyberspace, if regulators and broker-dealers do not adapt to the accel-
erating pace of technology. See id. SIA also noted in its introduction that the process of
adaptation in the securities industry never ends. See id. Finally, SIA advocated in the
summary of its comments that any new regulatory scheme for alternative trading systems
should be narrowly tailored to demonstrated regulatory needs. See id.
193. See supra Parts I.B.1-I.B.3 (describing the SEC's forward-looking no-action posi-
tions regarding certain Internet-based securities trading systems).
194. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,488 (noting that "[r]egulation
should not be static"). In the Release, the SEC expressly stated its willingness to work
with market participants to provide regulation for alternative trading systems in a manner
that does not stifle innovation. See id. at 30,500.
195. See Sam Scott Miller et al., Tethering Technology: The SEC's Market Structure
Concept, INSIGHTS, Sept. 1997, at 7, 11 ("While the Concept Release was issued under the
auspices of adapting to technological development, the proposed :reforms are more likely
to retard it.").
196. See Securities Industry Association, supra note 192 ("We wish to commend the
[SEC] for its thoughtful, innovative, and far-reaching effort to provide possible directions
for market regulation at the gateway of the 21st century.").
197. See American Bar Association, liftin4.htm (visited Nov. 19, 1997)
<http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s71697/liftin4.htm> (stating, in the "General approach"
section, that the Release did not identify any existing regulatory problems that needed to
be remedied); National Association of Securities Dealers, conleyl.htm (visited Oct. 17,
1997) <http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s71697/conley1.htm> (favoring the Release's al-
ternative of continued broker-dealer regulation of alternative trading systems); Orrick,
Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, miller2.htm (visited Oct. 17, 1997)
<http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s71697/miller2.htm> (stating, in the "General com-
ments" section, that the SEC's suggested alternatives would have "seismic" consequences
and promote unpredictable regulation); Peake, supra note 151 (providing in-depth criti-
cisms of the Release's suggested alternatives); Securities Industry Association, supra note
192 (criticizing the existing SEC suggestions and proposing detailed alternatives).
198. See supra Part III (examining and criticizing the two SEC alternatives set forth in
the Release); see also Miller et al., supra note 195, at 7-11 (criticizing the SEC's sugges-
tions for alternative trading system regulation).
199. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,498 (discussing the possibility of
a new SRO created by brokers and dealers under Section 15A of the 1934 Act).
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nation's securities exchanges, including those that are established on the
Internet.
2°°
A. The Insufficiency of Continued Broker-Dealer Regulation for
Alternative Trading Systems
The SEC hesitantly suggested in the Release that alternative trading
systems could continue to be regulated as broker-dealers. 1 In addition
to existing broker-dealer regulations, operators of the new systems and
their related SROs would be subjected to specially promulgated rules.
2°
With respect to Internet-based trading systems, however, this alternative
raises two serious issues.
First, the proposed continuation of broker-dealer regulation assumes
the presence of a broker-dealer, or broker-dealer related activity.Y
200. See infra notes 260-76 and accompanying text (discussing regulatory alternatives
capable of encompassing Internet technology).
201. Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,494-95 (detailing the SEC's reluc-
tance to continue the current regulatory scheme for alternative trading systems).
202. See id. at 30,495 (discussing the SEC's intention to create new rules specific to
alternative trading systems if the current system of broker-dealer regulation continues).
203. See id. at 30,495-96. In its discussion of regulation through existing broker-dealer
requirements, the Release presupposed that all operators of alternative trading systems
were registered broker-dealers. See id. at 30,495. Many broker-dealers have active alter-
native trading systems currently in effect, such as the Instinet, Bloomberg Tradebook, and
POSIT systems. See Miller et al., supra note 195, at 7; see also MARKET 2000 REPORT,
supra note 24, at 11-12, 11-13 (noting the difference between proprietary trading systems,
which are privately owned and affiliated with broker-dealers, and trading systems ex-
pressly owned and operated by broker-dealers). The SEC granted 11 no-action letters to
owners and operators of proprietary trading systems through April 1989. See Proprietary
Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 34-26708, 43 SEC Docket (CCH) 979, 979-80
n.3 (1989). These systems were sponsored by broker-dealers (including government secu-
rities broker-dealers), affiliated entities, or those entities that were in the process of regis-
tering with the SEC. See id. at 981 n.13. The SEC specifically noted that "proprietary sys-
tems that have developed to-date are distinguishable in function from exchange markets."
Id. at 984. Most importantly, the SEC stated that "[t]hese systems have not, however,
evolved into interdealer quotation or transaction mechanisms in which participants enter
two-sided quotations on a regular or continuous basis, thus ensuring a liquid market-
place." Id. By January 1994, the SEC's Division of Market Regulation had provided no-
action relief to 21 proprietary trading systems. See MARKET 2000 REPORT, supra note 24,
app. at IV-2. However, many of the systems that received no-action relief never began
operation, and only 10 systems were operative by January 1994. See id.; see also
TECHNOLOGY REPORT, supra note 9, at 97 n.292 (discussing alternative trading systems
that had been reviewed by the SEC).
The general understanding was that proprietary trading systems did not fall under the
1934 Act's definition of "exchange." See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 40, at 631. Al-
though the 1934 Act's definition included "'facilities for bringing together purchasers and
sellers of securities,"' it also limited the definition to those systems "'performing with re-
spect to securities the functions commonly performed by a stock exchange as that term is
generally understood."' Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1) (1994)) (emphasis added).
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Internet trading systems, however, do not necessarily require broker-
dealer participation. 4 In fact, the Internet-based trading systems that
have been reviewed by the SEC have been premised in part upon effi-
ciency gained through trades made without broker-dealers, and the SEC
has not required these systems to register as broker-dealers." 5 Thus,
these Internet-based systems would be subject only to the informal body
of regulation established by the SEC through the no-action process."' At
a minimum, if the suggestion for continued broker-dealer regulation of
alternative trading systems is implemented, the SEC should consider
codifying its no-action positions with respect to Internet trading systems
in order to promote uniformity.
Another issue raised by the Release's first alternative regulatory
framework concerns the evolving nature of Internet-based securities
trading systems. As these systems become less passive and begin to fa-
cilitate interactive trading activities, the need for suitable regulation will
arise.207 Under the Release's first alternative, however, it appears that
To correct this limitation, in 1988 the SEC proposed Rule 15c2-10 under the 1934 Act to
govern proprietary trading systems. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 40, at 632. Rule
15c2-10 offered a definition of "trading system" that included "any system that provides
for the dissemination outside the sponsor and its affiliates of indications of interest, quota-
tions, or orders to purchase or sell securities and that provides procedures for executing or
settling transactions in such securities." Exchange Act Release No. 34-26708, supra, at
986. Instead of promulgating Rule 15c2-10, however, the SEC issued Rule 17a-23 under
the 1934 Act. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-23 (1997). Rule 17a-23 requires specific recordkeeping
and reporting by proprietary trading systems. See id.; see also Recordkeeping and Re-
porting Requirements for Trading Systems Operated by Brokers and Dealers, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-33605, 56 SEC Docket (CCH) 35, 35-36 (1994) (discussing the SEC's
rationale for establishing reporting and recordkeeping requirements for proprietary trad-
ing systems). Under the SEC's April 29, 1998 proposed rules, Rule 17a-23 would be re-
pealed, and alternative trading systems would be required to furnish information to the
SEC in accordance with proposed Regulation ATS. See Regulation of Exchanges and Al-
ternative Trading Systems, 63 Fed. Reg. at 23,507.
204. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 6-14 (noting that Internet-based trading systems
have not been required to register as broker-dealers); see also supra Parts I.B.1-I.B.3. (de-
scribing the SEC's grant of no-action letters to Internet trading systems). To date, the
SEC has allowed Internet-based trading systems to remain outside the realm of broker-
dealer regulations, as long as the specific requirements set forth in each trading system's
no-action letters are met. See supra Parts I.B.1-I.B.3 (discussing, in part, the SEC's posi-
tion with respect to broker-dealer regulation of certain Internet-based trading systems).
205. See supra Parts I.B.1-I.B.3 (discussing, in part, the rationale for the creation of
certain Internet-based trading systems).
206. See supra notes 109-44 and accompanying text (detailing the no-action and inter-
pretive positions of the SEC with respect to Internet-based securities trading systems).
207. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 6-4 (noting that the existing differences between
Internet-based trading systems and exchanges will become more blurred if certain pro-
posed Internet-based systems are implemented). The future of Internet-based trading
does not necessarily rest with the passive trading systems approved by the SEC, as evi-
denced by at least one organization that plans to create a "cyber stock exchange." See id.
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the only regulatory framework available to these future systems will be
in the form of broker-dealer regulation, and SRO oversight.28 Given the
current structure of the securities industry, this regulatory structure
would require non-passive Internet-based trading systems to seek SRO
regulation from the NASD.'
Regulation of Internet-based trading systems by the NASD presents
an inherent conflict of interest.20  Because non-passive Internet-based
systems foreseeably could compete with the Nasdaq market, regulation
by the NASD would trigger competitive concerns and could stifle these
systems from inception."' Although the tone of the Release indicated
This exchange would consist of a Web site having links that would enable investors to buy
stock directly from publicly traded corporations, as well as allowing visitors to trade stock
on a bulletin board linked to the Web site. See id. at 6-4 to 6-5. There are several other
organizations planning to build similar, active Internet-based trading systems. See infra
note 219 (citing sources that discuss planned Internet-based stock exchanges).
Andrew Klein, president of Wit Capital, has posited one of the most ambitious and
timely Internet-based stock exchange proposals. See Wit Capital, Our Services (visited
Oct. 29, 1997) <http://www.witcapital.com.>. Wit Capital's proposed Internet stock ex-
change will be called the "Digital Stock Market." See id. Wit Capital planned for this ex-
change to become operational in 1998. See id. The Digital Stock Market will provide less
expensive trading alternatives because investors will be able to avoid broker or specialist
trading fees. See id. Wit Capital envisions that this new, Internet-based exchange will al-
low investors to create their own auctions for stocks, and the company will handle the al-
location of shares among investor members. See id.
208. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,495-97 (describing the possibility
of continued broker-dealer regulation of alternative trading systems); but cf id. at 30,497-
99 (discussing various regulatory burdens and inadequacies that the continued broker-
dealer regulation would create).
209. See Cox ET AL., supra note 10, at 29 (finding that the NASD is the only national
securities association under the 1934 Act).
210. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,498 (stating that operators of
alternative trading systems have been reluctant to comply with SRO surveillance activities
in instances where the SRO operated its own trading system); MARKET 2000 REPORT,
supra note 24, at 2 ("[F]air competition among markets and market participants should be
promoted."). The SEC stated that "the benefits of competition should not be lost in an
attempt to capture the advantages of uniformity." Id. at 13. In addition, the SEC found
that "fair market competition can be promoted by fairly allocating regulatory responsibili-
ties ... without stifling the ability of alternative markets and services to emerge." Id. at 25
(emphasis added); see also Peake, supra note 151 (discussing conflicts of interest created
by Nasdaq). Professor Peake called for neutral regulation of market centers in order to
avoid conflicts of interest. See id. Professor Peake regards this approach as especially im-
portant for the NASD because the NASD owns and operates its own market center, the
Nasdaq. See id.; see also Bill Singer & Vincent P. Liberti, Singer Zamansky LLP,
singerl.htm (visited Nov. 7, 1997) <http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s71697/singerl.htm>
(discussing, in its "National Self-Regulatory Organization" section, the past abuses that
the NASD inflicted upon electronic members, and advocating an SRO presence unique to
Internet-based exchanges); supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text (discussing the
abuses that have taken place within the NASD, including anti-competitive practices).
211. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text (discussing, in part, the abuses pres-
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that the SEC did not want to pursue the continued regulation of alterna-
tive trading systems as broker-dealers,"' if the first alternative is to re-
main a viable option, the SEC must pursue SRO alternatives to the
NASD.
B. The Redefinition of "Exchange": Wall Street Meets Silicon Valley
The Release's second suggested framework for the incorporation of al-
ternative trading systems into the existing regulatory framework involved
the restructuring of the definition of "exchange" as it appears in the 1934
Act."' The new regulatory system would include three tiers of ex-
changes. 4 At a minimum, the modification of the definition of "ex-
change" and the division of exchanges into three tiers would allow Inter-.• • 215
net-based trading systems to fit into a proposed classification. Internet-
based trading systems thus would be eligible for more comprehensive,predctabe, nd efecive " °  216
predictable, and effective regulation. Yet, despite the fact that this al-
ternative would improve upon the existing regulatory structure, it might
be unduly burdensome if applied in practice."' The intricate and divisive
ent in the NASD and the effect of NASD activities on SOES). Although the NASD has
responded to SEC and Department of Justice investigations by implementing procedures
to remedy past abuses, an inherent conflict of interest will remain as long as the NASD is
directly affiliated with the operation of the Nasdaq market. See supra note 210 (providing
Professor Peake's opinion regarding inherent conflicts with SROs that operate trading
markets).
212. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,490 (discussing the potential con-
tinuation of broker-dealer regulation with a negative bias, as evidenced by at least two
subsection headings: "II.B.1 The Current Regulatory Approach Applies Inappropriate
Regulation to Alternative Trading Systems"; and "II.B.2. The Current Regulatory Ap-
proach Impedes Effective Regulation").
213. See id. at 30,505.
214. See supra Part II (describing the new three-tiered approach of exchange regula-
tion suggested by the Release).
215. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,487. The SEC proposed imple-
menting the three-tiered approach to exchange regulation by redefining the term "ex-
change." See id. The newly proposed definition would incorporate any organization that
"(1) consolidates orders of multiple parties; and (2) provides a facility through which, or
sets material conditions under which, participants entering such orders may agree to the
terms of a trade." Id. Given the broad scope of the Release's suggested definition, it ap-
pears that active Internet-based securities trading systems would be classified as exchanges
if the redefinition is implemented. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, § 6.01(c) (discussing the
level of activity that will occur on active Internet-based securities trading systems); see also
supra Parts I.B.1-I.B.3 (describing some of the Internet-based securities trading systems
that have operated to date, and the SEC response thereto).
216. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,486-88 (describing the suggested
regulatory frameworks that could be imposed upon qualifying alternative trading sys-
tems).
217. See Miller et al., supra note 195, at 9 (discussing the overly burdensome nature of
the Release's suggested redefinition of the term "exchange").
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nature of this alternative would complicate the scheme of exchange
regulation, contravening the SEC's goal of regulatory simplification.21
1. What is Behind Tier One?
Within the redefinition suggestion, the SEC has accounted-whether
expressly or implicitly-for all types of exchange structures: from tradi-
tional exchanges like the NYSE to the proposed Internet stock ex-
changes of the future.219 The first tier definition of exchange would in-
clude all alternative trading systems that have limited volume or those
220that do not establish trading prices. Such trading systems would be ex-
empt from regulation as "exchanges.,
221
By definition, this first tier encompasses the Internet-based trading sys-
tems that already have begun operation.22 The first tier does not impose
SRO membership on alternative trading systems, even though these sys-
tems would not be required to register as national securities exchanges,
and thus would not qualify as SROs under the 1934 Act.22 The Release
218. See id.
219. See supra Part II.B (describing the Release's three-tiered framework for ex-
change regulation). For discussions of proposed Internet-based securities exchanges, see
Brewing Company Takes on the NYSE, NET GUIDE, June 1996, at 13 (discussing Andrew
Klein's vision of an Internet-based stock exchange that could compete with the New York
Stock Exchange); Bill Barnhart, Internet Rewriting Scripts for Stock Market Dramas, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 26, 1996, at C1 (describing the present and future impact of the Internet upon
the securities industry); Matthew Doull, Bypass the Broker, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH
(LONDON), Apr. 23, 1996, at 12 (discussing American innovation in Internet-based securi-
ties trading and its effect on the British securities industry); Leslie Eaton, Slow Transition
for Investing: Stock Market Meets Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1996, at Al (describing
the various uses and unlimited potential for the Internet within the securities industry);
Beth Healy, Trades with a twist, to Wit, a Net Broker, BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 14, 1997, at
31 (discussing Andrew Klein's interaction with Massachusetts securities regulators over
plans to operate an Internet-based stock exchange); Helen Huntley, Brokers Push Web
Exchange, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (FLORIDA), Mar. 7, 1997, at 1E (discussing the Globe-
Net Stock Exchange, an Internet-based stock market planned by Floridian entrepreneurs);
Bruce Rule, Wit Capital Acquires Rights to Stock Trading Software; Recruits Former
NYSE Technology Chief Keith as CIO, INVESTMENT DEALERS DIG., Sept. 9, 1996, at 14
(discussing business moves of Andrew Klein as he pursues an Internet-based stock ex-
change).
220. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,487.
221. See id. (noting that most such exchanges would be exempt); see also supra notes
214-20; infra notes 222-42 and accompanying text (describing the SEC's tiered approach to
the definition of exchange).
222. See supra notes 109-44 and accompanying text (discussing several of the Internet-
based trading systems that have been reviewed by the SEC).
223. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,500 (stating that the SEC could
exempt small trading systems from all exchange registration requirements under either
Section 5 or Section 36 of the 1934 Act).
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does, however, list several stringent requirements for first tier ex-
changes. 24 These requirements, while less burdensome than traditional
exchange regulation, could prove to stifle fledgling Internet-based trad-
ing systems. Specifically, any requirement that would necessitate sub-
stantial interaction between Internet-based systems and an existing SRO,
such as reporting requirements,225 would raise concerns similar to those
226associated with NASD regulation of these systems.
Pursuant to the Release's second alternative, first tier exchanges would
be required to assume certain duties traditionally allocated to SROs, and
accordingly would bear burdens and costs that could adversely affect
their growth."' Membership in an SRO, rather than simply assuming
SRO responsibility, would appear to be more suitable for first tier ex-
changes. Unfortunately, within the existing market structure, the NASD
remains the only SRO available to first tier exchanges. 28 Therefore, al-
though the first tier exhibits an innovative regulatory approach by the
SEC, it could be an overly burdensome environment for Internet-based
trading systems.
2. One Step Up to Tier Two
The Release's second tier of exchanges only incorporated those alter-
native trading systems that have a substantial volume of trading.229 These
224. See id. at 30,501. In addition to completing an initial application with the SEC,
the Release proposed that first tier exchanges could be required to:
(1) Notify the [SEC] in the event of a material change in operations or control;
(2) maintain a record of trading through the system and make such information
available to the [SEC] upon request; (3) implement procedures for surveillance
of employees' trading... ; (4) cooperate with registered SRO investigations and
examinations of the exempted exchange's participants; (5) report trades to one or
more designated SROs ... ; and (6) require participants to make adequate clear-
ance and settlement arrangements prior to participation in trading on the ex-
empted exchange.
Id.
225. See id. (requiring that alternative trading systems report trades to one or more
designated SROs).
226. See supra note 210 (discussing Professor Peake's comments on the inherent con-
flict of interest surrounding NASD's operation of the Nasdaq market); see also supra notes
95-97 and accompanying text (discussing the anti-competitive practices and other abuses
found within the NASD); supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text (discussing the SRO
options available within the current market structure).
227. See Miller et al., supra note 195, at 9 (discussing the "user unfriendly" nature of
the Release's proposed exchange redefinition).
228. See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text (describing the SRO options avail-
able to Internet-based trading system under the existing regulatory framework).
229. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,487 (describing the second tier of
exchanges); see also supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text (discussing the Release's
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trading systems would be required to register as national securities ex-
230changes under existing 1934 Act requirements. Second tier exchanges
would be regulated as national exchanges with certain exceptions made
to eliminate growth barriers. 23 ' As such, second tier exchanges would be
subjected to a regulatory scheme more predictable than the others sug-
gested in the Release.2
The volume of trading on the Internet-based trading systems that have
already been reviewed by the SEC would not be sufficient to warrant
classification in this tier.23  The second tier assumes either that a trading
system graduates from the first tier when its trading volume increases or
that the system has a substantial volume of trading from its inception.
2 4
The provisions in the Release suggesting the first tier's framework do not
provide the environment needed by Internet-based systems for growth,
and thus a graduation from the first tier to the second tier would be an
impossibility for such systems.235 Furthermore, given the infant state of
Internet-based trading, it would be unreasonable to assume that a newly-
created system could meet the definitional requirements of the second
tier upon its inception.2 36 Thus, Internet-based trading systems will be in
limbo because they are inadequately provided for in the first tier, and not
proposed second tier of exchanges).
230. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,487 (describing the second tier of
exchanges); see also supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text (describing how trading
systems attaining a substantial level of volume would be incorporated within the second
tier of exchanges).
231. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,487 (describing how the SEC
could grant exemptions to second tier exchanges to eliminate barriers to growth).
232. See id.
233. See supra Parts I.B.1-I.B.3 (describing the SEC's current no-action position with
regard to Internet-based securities trading systems).
234. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,500. (discussing the progression
of alternative trading systems from the first tier to the second tier of exchanges). Given
the Internet-based trading systems that have already begun operation, it would be hard to
imagine an Internet-based trading system that would initially draw substantial volume.
See supra Parts I.B.1-I.B.3 (describing the Internet-based trading systems that have been
operated to date). Within the limited history of Internet-based securities trading, one of
the motivating factors behind the creation of the systems remains constant, namely the
inability to access capital through traditional means. See Angel Capital No-Action Letter,
supra note 32, at *1-2 (discussing the hardship a small company faces as it tries to access
investment capital through traditional means). Therefore, for an Internet-based trading
system to be included in the Release's second tier, the system would have to develop its
volume to the point where it could graduate from its position in the first tier.
235. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,500 (describing the SEC's vision
of a progression for alternative trading systems from the first to second tier).
236. See supra notes 234-35 and accompanying text (discussing the progression of
Internet-based trading systems within the Release's proposed system of tiered exchange
regulation).
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advanced enough at initiation to be eligible for inclusion in the second
tier.
3. The Third Tier's Intrusion Upon the Old Boy Exchange System
Finally, the third tier of exchanges would consist of the traditional ex-
changes.237 At first glance, this tier seems to have little impact on Inter-
net-based exchanges. The third tier, however, is important to Internet-
based systems because it would provide traditional exchanges with ex-
emptions from certain SEC regulations in the interest of competitive
fairness. Such exemptions would make traditional exchange regulation
less burdensome, and also might benefit alternative trading systems.239 If
existing restrictions on traditional exchanges are eased, these exchanges
might be dissuaded from employing anti-competitive tactics against
smaller competitors, much to the benefit of Internet-based trading sys-
tems.240
When viewed as a whole, the SEC's tiered structure of exchange regu-
lation is an innovative approach to an existing regulatory void. This ap-
proach, however, does not consider the impending growth of Internet-
based securities exchanges.2 4 ' The tiered approach focuses regulation on
existing proprietary systems while ignoring the impending rise of Inter-
net-based exchanges. Without modification, the Release lacks adequate
provisions necessary to regulate Internet-based exchanges in a fair and
consistent manner.242
IV. THE SEC LISTENS
After reviewing the comments letters received in connection with the
Release, the SEC published proposed rules (Rules) for the regulation of
exchanged and alternative trading systems on April 29, 1998.2' The pro-
237. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,487 (describing the third tier of
exchanges proposed by the SEC); see also supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing how the traditional exchanges would benefit from the Release's suggested tiered
structure for exchange regulation).
238. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,487 (discussing the competitive
benefits that traditional exchanges would experience as a result of SEC exemptions from
regulatory burdens).
239. See id.
240. See id. (discussing the competitive advantages that SEC exemptions could pro-
vide for third tier exchanges).
241. See supra note 219 and accompanying text (discussing the future of Internet-
based securities trading).
242. See supra notes 220-28 and accompanying text (describing the inadequacy of the
first tier as applied to Internet-based trading systems).
243. See Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, 63 Fed. Reg. at
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posed rules essentially combined the two alternatives set forth in the
Release.2"4 Therefore, operators of alternative trading systems would
have a choice between exchange regulation and continued broker-dealer
regulation.24' Although now combined, the SEC proposals are substan-
tially the same as the suggestions found in the Release. The SEC did,
however, adapt specific portions of the Release's regulatory alternatives
in light of the views expressed in many of the comment letters.246
A. The Proposed Regulatory Structure
The proposed rules evidence the SEC's desire to adopt a flexible
regulatory framework for alternative trading systems.247 This flexibility is
provided through the availability of regulatory options for alternative
trading systems. Specifically, the Rules would allow alternative trading
systems to register as either broker-dealers or as national securities ex-
changes.248
The Rules include a new Regulation ATS, which would impose addi-
tional requirements on alternative trading system that choose to register
as broker-dealers.249 Under the proposed Regulation ATS, alternative
trading systems that opt for broker-dealer regulation would be regulated
in accordance with the level of their trading volume. 2' ° Those alternative
trading systems with limited volume would have to meet only minimal
regulatory requirements, such as providing notice of operation to the
SEC and maintaining adequate records. 5' Alternative trading systems
that experience significant trading volume would be subject to a much
more rigorous regulatory regimen, including price dissemination re-
23,504.
244. See id. at 23,506 (discussing the options for alternative trading system regulation
under the proposed rules).
245. See id.
246. See id. at 23,538 (describing how the SEC responded to comments by not adopt-
ing a tiered approach to exchange regulation).
247. See id. at 23,506 (discussing how the proposed rules should provide adequate
flexibility for alternative trading system regulation).
248. See id.
249. See id. at 23,507 (describing the broker-dealer registration option).
250. See id. (detailing the different requirements for high and low volume alternative
trading systems).
251. See id. Specifically, the Rules propose that limited volume alternative trading
systems would have to: (1) notify the SEC of the system's operation; (2) provide the SEC
with quarterly reports; and (3) maintain audit trails of transactions and other records. See
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252quirements and participant oversight activities.
For alternative trading systems that choose to be regulated as ex-
changes, the Rules propose the promulgation of new Rule 3b-12. 53 Un-
der this new rule, certain terms used in the SEC's current definition of
"exchange" would be defined to encompass most alternative trading sys-
tems. As opposed to the three tier approach to exchange regulation sug-
gested in the Release, the Rules propose that alternative trading systems
electing to be regulated as exchanges would be subject to the same regu-
latory requirements as existing registered exchanges with certain modifi-
cations.254
B. Internet-Based Exchanges Still in the Dark
Like the Release, the Rules evidence the SEC's timely commitment to
provide a comprehensive regulatory framework for alternative trading
systems. Also like the Release, the Rules do not specifically address the
various issues raised by the advent of Internet-based securities ex-
changes. Unfortunately, because the Rules leave us without a structured
regulatory framework that is specifically mindful of Internet-based trad-
ing systems, these systems could be subjected to uneven regulation.
The Rules propose that alternative trading systems could elect to be
regulated as broker-dealers.2 5  As discussed above, the Release initially
suggested a system of continued broker-dealer regulation for alternative
252. See id. The Rules propose that alternative trading systems with significant vol-
ume should be required to satisfy various requirements in addition to the requirements set
forth for limited volume trading systems. Id. First, systems with significant volume would
be required to link to a registered market for the purpose of disseminating prices to the
public. See id. Second, these systems would be required to comply with the rules regard-
ing execution priorities and obligations which are imposed upon members of the regis-
tered markets. See id. In addition, trading systems with significant volume would have to:
"(1) Grant or deny access based on standards established by the trading system and ap-
plied in a non-discriminatory manner; and (2) establish procedures to ensure adequate
systems capacity, integrity, and contingency planning." Id.
253, See id. at 23,506. Rule 3b-12 would incorporate "any organization, association,
person, group of persons, or system that: (1) Consolidates orders of multiple parties; and
(2) sets non-discretionary material conditions (whether by providing a trading facility or
by setting rules) under which subscribers entering such orders agree to the terms of a
trade." Id. Rule 3b-12 would exclude trading systems that serve limited functions, such as
routing orders to a registered exchange. See id.
254. See id. at 23,524 (discussing the proposed system of exchange registration for al-
ternative trading systems). In the Rules, the SEC solicited comments regarding whether
any exemptions from exchange regulation should be made to accommodate alternative
trading systems. See id. In addition, the SEC proposed amending the registration applica-
tion forms for alternative trading systems to allow for various types of membership, or
non-membership, structures. See id. at 23,507.
255. See id. at 23,506.
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trading systems.26 As with the Release's suggestion, the proposal in the
Rules is an inadequate solution to the regulatory void existing for Inter-
257net-based trading systems, including Internet-based exchanges.
Although the Rules have eliminated the confusing, intricate tiered ap-
proach to exchange regulation, the remaining regulatory option appears
to preclude the participation of Internet-based exchanges. Without the
tiered approach, it seems even less likely that Internet-based trading sys-
tems could elect to be regulated as an exchange. As discussed above,
Internet-based systems would most likely experience little volume as
they begin operation."" Therefore, a system of full exchange regulation,
with all of its attendant responsibilities, would be an extreme burden for
fledgling Internet-based trading systems.21' As such, exchange regulation
under the Rules would not be an alternative for Internet-based securities
exchanges.
V. A NEW NATIONAL SECURITIES ASSOCIATION AND THE FOSTERING
OF INTERNET-BASED EXCHANGES
An alternative to the suggestions set forth in the Release would be the
creation of a new "national securities association" (NSA).2 ° Internet-
256. See supra Part II.A (detailing the Release's suggestion for the continued regula-
tion of alternative trading systems as broker-dealers).
257. See supra Part III.A (analyzing the insufficiencies of continued broker-dealer
regulation of alternative trading systems in light of Internet-based trading systems).
258 See supra Part III.A.2 (arguing that the Release's suggested second tier of ex-
changes would be unsuitable for Internet-based trading systems due to the limited nature
of trading volume that these systems will command).
259. The Rules propose that alternative trading systems electing to be regulated as
exchanges would be subject to "exchange obligations [which are] fundamental to the fair
and efficient operation of exchanges." Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading
Systems, 63 Fed. Reg. at 23,524. As part of these obligations, exchange-registered alterna-
tive trading systems would be required to fulfill the self-regulatory obligations of the 1934
Act. See id. This obligation, along with the various other requirements that the 1934 Act
impose upon registered exchanges, would be a burden to fledging Internet-based ex-
changes.
260. In the 1938 Maloney Act, which became § 15A of the 1934 Act, Congress offi-
cially sanctioned NSAs. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 40, at 644. Congress created
NSAs after finding that the OTC market on which broker-dealers operated was the pri-
mary source of major underwritings in the country, and thus was the channel by which
American dollars flowed into new financings. See H.R. REP. No. 75-2307, at 3-5 (1938).
Congress looked to the legislative history of the 1934 Act because it wanted:
[T]o authorize the [SEC] to subject [OTC trading] to regulation similar to that
prescribed for transactions on organized exchanges. This power is vitally neces-
sary to forestall the widespread evasion of stock-exchange regulation by the
withdrawal of securities from listing on exchanges, and by transferring trading
therein to 'over-the-counter' markets where manipulative evils could continue to
flourish, unchecked by any regulatory authority.
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based trading systems, along with other types of alternative trading sys-
tems, provide a regulatory challenge to the SEC akin to that which led to
the creation of NSAs in the 1934 Act."' A new NSA would operate as
the SRO for all alternative trading systems, including Internet-based
trading systems.2 2 Although the 1934 Act provides for the creation of
such associations only when all members are broker-dealers, Congress
could amend the pertinent statutory section, or create an analogous sec-
tion relating specifically to alternative, non-traditional trading systems.263
Amendment of the 1934 Act would entail congressional action similar to
that which originally gave rise to NSAs.2 4
A new NSA would be crucial to the regulation of Internet-based trad-
ing systems; the NSA would provide a regulatory presence that would
promote compliance with applicable regulations while simultaneously es-
265tablishing notions of fair dealing. In addition, just as the NASD has
fostered and overseen the Nasdaq market, so too would the new NSA,
comprised of Internet-based and other alternative trading system mem-
bers, act as a protective shield for fledgling Internet-based trading sys-
tems. This protection would extend to Internet securities exchanges,
Id. at 3 (quoting S. REP. No. 73-792, at 6 (1934)).
In adopting the NSA structure, Congress looked at two alternatives: (1) the enlargement
of the SEC, and (2) the creation of a system of "cooperative regulation" akin to that found
in well-run stock exchanges. See id. at 4; S. REP. NO. 75-1455, at 3-4 (1938) (discussing the
two regulatory alternatives available to Congress). The purpose of a national securities
association is to supervise the conduct of its members "under the general aegis of the
[SEC]." Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 40, at 644. The National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) is the only organization ever to apply for registration as a national secu-
rities association. See id. The NASD regulates through rulemaking and "enforces its rules
through a system of inspection comparable to that of the [SEC] and the exchanges." Id. at
645.
In an attempt to promote equality between traditional stock exchanges and the OTC
market, Congress amended § 15A of the 1934 Act in 1964 to make broker-dealer member-
ship in a self-regulating organization mandatory. See id. Those broker-dealers not regis-
tered with the NASD were subject to direct regulation by the SEC. See id. In 1983, Con-
gress amended the 1934 Act to make it illegal for brokers or dealers to effect any trades
unless they were a member of the NASD or the exchange on which they were trading. See
H.R. REP. No. 98-106, at 1, 6, 8 (1983) (discussing Congress's decision to require broker-
dealers to join a national securities association or an exchange).
261. See supra note 260 (detailing the statutory basis for the creation of NSAs).
262. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,498 (suggesting that a new na-
tional securities association for alternative trading systems could be created under § 15A
of the 1934 Act).
263. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1994) (providing the statutory framework for the creation
of national securities associations).
264. See supra note 260 and accompanying text (discussing the creation of NSAs under
the 1934 Act).
265. See supra notes 156-71 and accompanying text (detailing the Release's proposed
regulation of alternative trading systems as broker-dealers).
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which, without NSA oversight, might fall prey to over-regulation and the
superior market power of existing rivals.266
If a new NSA is established, the current statutory framework should,
in the interest of competitive fairness, be altered to prohibit the creation
and operation of a securities exchange by any such NSA.267 Under the
existing securities market structure, an inherent conflict exists because
the NASD owns and operates Nasdaq, yet serves as the overseeing SRO
for other broker-dealer trading systems.268 A purely regulatory NSA
would be more conducive to efficient and even-handed oversight of al-
ternative trading systems. In addition, such an SRO presence would help
fulfill the mission of the 1934 Act by protecting the nation's investors1 69
against fraud and manipulation, thereby helping to ensure fair markets.
At the same time, the new NSA would allow smaller companies to gain
access to otherwise unobtainable capital through Internet-based IPOs
and subsequent secondary market trading, while investors would save on
transaction costs due to increased efficiency and/or the removal of mid-
dlemen in their securities trades.27°
Ultimately, the goal of a new NSA for alternative trading systems
would be to provide a presence similar to that of the Small Business
Administration (SBA).27' Like the SBA, the new NSA could foster the
266. See Peake, supra note 151 (discussing the competitive market pressures that al-
ternative trading systems would face under the Release's tiered regulatory scheme). In an
analogous situation, there was a great debate in the late 1960s among market participants
regarding the possibility that Nasdaq would provide quotations for stocks listed with the
NYSE or AMEX. See 3 Securities Industry Study, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Sec.,
Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 92nd Cong., at 4 (1972). In response
to the debate, the National Association of Securities Dealers Board of Governors voted
that Nasdaq would not provide quotations for NYSE or Amex securities. See id. at 10.
The NASD most likely reached this decision out of fear that NYSE members would boy-
cott the Nasdaq system if it created competition with NYSE specialists and/or NYSE
stocks. See 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 22, at 2582-83 n.282.
267. See Peake, supra note 151 (discussing the advantage of separating self-regulatory
duties from the owning and operation of a securities exchange).
268. See Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,490 (describing the NASD's
regulation of alternative trading systems and the inherent conflict that arises due to
NASD's operation of the Nasdaq system); see also supra notes 95-97 (discussing the
abuses, including anti-competitive practice, that have taken place within the NASD).
269. See supra note 260 and accompanying text (discussing the creation of NSAs and
the regulatory role that NSAs serve in the securities markets); see also supra notes 14-16
and accompanying text (discussing the objectives and purpose of the 1934 Act).
270. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (describing the reasons why Internet-
based trading can help smaller companies and investors).
271. The SBA's fundamental purpose is to aid, counsel, assist, and protect the interests
of small businesses. See 15 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1994). When creating the SBA, Congress spe-
cifically noted that the basis of the American economy is free competition. See id. Fur-
thermore, Congress stated that promoting full and free competition creates free markets
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growth of its members, while simultaneously protecting the public from a
member's bad acts.2  Investor protection would be accomplished
through close oversight and a requirement of reporting to the SEC.
273
Furthermore, a new NSA that understands and adapts to new technology
could maintain regulatory stability more adequately than either the SEC
274or a more traditional oversight entity.
The creation of a new NSA would entail statutory revisions, but could
be more flexible and effective than the overly burdensome and intricate
alternatives set forth in the Release. The basic tenets of the Release,
however, need not be abandoned. For example, if a member trading sys-
tem within the new NSA began to experience sustained, heavy trading
volume, it could be subjected to fuller regulation as a traditional ex-
change.275 If such a situation arose, the SEC could use its new exemptive
authority to loosen the restrictions on traditional exchanges, thereby
providing an even playing field for the competing exchanges. 76
VI. CONCLUSION
The creation of Internet-based and other alternative trading systems
has caused the SEC to address the future of securities exchange regula-
tion. Unfortunately, the SEC's response to alternative trading system
development is insufficient with respect to Internet-based trading.
Within the suggested regulatory alternatives in the Release and the
Rules, the SEC fails to expressly provide for fully active, Internet-based
securities exchanges. The existing body of regulation for Internet-based
trading is in the form of ad hoc, non-binding no-action letters issued by
the SEC. The securities industry and the nation's investors need specific
guidance regarding Internet-based securities trading. While well-
intentioned, the SEC's suggestions in the Release and the Rules fail to
and free entry into business. See id. A nurturing presence, such as the SBA, would pro-
vide necessary support for alternative trading systems as they begin operation and attempt
to compete with the already established more powerful exchanges.
272. See supra note 271 (discussing the functions of the SBA).
273. Cf supra note 260 (discussing the role of NSAs). The new NSA for alternative
trading systems would operate similarly to the NASD, except that the members of the new
NSA would be the owners and operators of alternative trading systems as opposed to bro-
kers and dealers only. See supra Part IV (proposing the creation of a new national securi-
ties association for alternative trading systems).
274. See H.R. REP. No. 75-2307, at 4-6 (1938) (describing how a NSA would be more
efficient than direct SEC oversight). Congress looked to the NSA system of regulation
because regulation would be handled by representative organizations of market profes-
sionals, with proper SEC oversight. See id. at 5.
275. See supra note 234 (discussing the progression from the first tier to the second).
276. See supra notes 183-186 and accompanying text (discussing the third tier of ex-
changes proposed in the Release).
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provide a suitable framework for Internet-based trading systems. This
framework should be provided by a new NSA, and not left to the existing
collection of inapplicable rules and conflicting interests. A new NSA
would provide the necessary break from tradition, and could be the pro-
pelling force behind creative innovation in securities trading for years to
come. Regulation of Internet-based securities exchanges is crucial, and a
new NSA would be an effective means by which to provide this regula-
tion. Time is of the essence, for the era is rapidly approaching when the
Internet's place in the world of securities exchanges will become much
more than virtual reality.
